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LEXISNEXIS SUMMARY:
... Absent a federal common law rule of vicarious fiduciary liability, a corporate employer, in its nonfiduciary capacity
as the settlor of its ERISA plan, may design the documents that govern the employer's plan as a shield against fiduciary
responsibility for the actions of the employer's own internal fiduciary employees. ... This Article explores the potential
for development of another area of federal common law under ERISA - the incorporation of respondeat superior
liability principles to impose ERISA fiduciary liability ("vicarious fiduciary liability") upon a corporation for the
fiduciary activities of its employees or agents. ... This claims and remedies system requires that vicarious fiduciary
liability must be limited so that a nonfiduciary corporate principal is not subject to a damages claim under ERISA if an
employee or an agent of the principal acts in a "rogue" manner as a fiduciary with respect to an ERISA plan. ... The
question simply was not at the forefront of the immediate problems of trust asset mismanagement in the multiemployer
and defined benefit plan context that Congress sought to resolve through ERISA's fiduciary responsibilities provisions.
... ERISA, however, defines "fiduciary" not in terms of formal trusteeship, but in functional terms of control and
authority over the plan, thus expanding the universe of persons subject to fiduciary duties - and to damages - under
ERISA . ... Similarly, external corporate fiduciaries and external nonfiduciary service providers who assist employers
in administering and operating their ERISA plans may increase the fees for their services if the parameters of vicarious
fiduciary liability are ill-defined and therefore difficult to monitor and control. ... If imposing vicarious fiduciary
liability makes corporate employers the proverbial deep pocket for the misconduct of internal fiduciary employees, then
employers are likely to respond by engaging in tactics to protect corporate assets from fiduciary liability. ... To be
consistent with ERISA's statutory scheme for claims and remedies under section 502(a), a federal common law rule of
vicarious liability must be limited by modifying the common law rule that imposed respondeat superior liability upon a
principal who approved or ratified an agent's injurious conduct that occurred outside the scope of employment.

HIGHLIGHT: A federal common law rule of vicarious fiduciary liability under ERISA is necessary for two reasons.
First, a rule of vicarious fiduciary liability is essential to maintaining and enforcing ERISA's comprehensive system of
fiduciary regulation. Second, vicarious fiduciary liability is needed to prevent employer overreaching under the
judicially-created settlor function defense to breach of fiduciary duty claims. Absent a federal common law rule of
vicarious fiduciary liability, a corporate employer, in its nonfiduciary capacity as the settlor of its ERISA plan, may
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design the documents that govern the employer's plan as a shield against fiduciary responsibility for the actions of the
employer's own internal fiduciary employees. This misuse of nonfiduciary settlor powers, which is contrary to both the
letter and the spirit of ERISA, would be prevented by a federal common law rule of vicarious fiduciary liability.
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), the federal law that regulates employer-sponsored
benefit plans, has a rich history of judicially-created federal common law. This Article explores the theoretical, policy,
statutory, and stare decisis grounds for the development of another area of federal common law under ERISA - the
incorporation of respondeat superior liability principles to impose ERISA fiduciary liability ("vicarious fiduciary
liability") upon a corporation for the fiduciary activities of its employees or agents. The Article proposes that the federal
courts should adopt a federal common law rule of vicarious fiduciary liability under ERISA based on the traditional
scope of employment approach. Under such a rule, a corporate principal whose own internal employees or agents
perform fiduciary functions during the course and within the scope of their employment or agency relationship would
be strictly liable under ERISA for any breach of fiduciary duty by the employee or agent. Vicarious fiduciary liability
should be limited, however, so that a nonfiduciary corporate principal would not be subject to damages claims under
ERISA for the rogue fiduciary activities of its employees or agents, but would be subject to restitution as necessary to
prevent unjust enrichment of the principal.
TEXT:
[*250]
Introduction
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), n1 the federal law that regulates
employer-sponsored benefit plans, has a rich history of judicially-created federal common law. Examples where the
federal courts have incorporated state law principles or doctrines as ERISA federal common law include the contract
interpretation doctrine of contra proferentem, n2 state laws establishing statutes of limitations, n3 state law principles
governing corporations, n4 common law trust principles, n5 and common law remedies available in equity. n6 This
Article explores the potential for development of another area of federal common law under ERISA - the incorporation
of respondeat superior liability principles to impose ERISA fiduciary liability ("vicarious fiduciary liability") upon a
corporation for the fiduciary activities of its employees or agents. n7
In enacting ERISA, Congress contemplated that "a body of Federal substantive law will be developed by the courts
to deal with issues involving rights and obligations under private welfare and pension plans." n8 The federal courts have
used state law principles and doctrines as "gap-fillers" where the federal statute itself is silent or ambiguous, or where a
federal common law rule would promote ERISA's fundamental policies. n9 But judicial authority to supplement the
statutory language of ERISA cannot rewrite the statutory scheme itself. If the role of federal common law is to serve as
a statutory gap-filler, then a federal common law rule of vicarious fiduciary liability must be reconcilable with both the
policy objectives and the complex statutory provisions of ERISA. This Article contributes to the scholarly literature by
providing a comprehensive analysis of the theoretical, policy, statutory, and stare decisis [*251] grounds for a federal
common law rule of vicarious fiduciary liability. n10
The Article makes two interrelated claims. The first claim is that the federal common law of ERISA should include
a rule of vicarious fiduciary liability. Under such a rule, a corporate principal whose own employees or agents perform
fiduciary functions during the course and within the scope of their employment or agency relationship would be strictly
liable under ERISA for any breach of fiduciary duty by the employee or agent. In applying a federal common law rule
of vicarious fiduciary liability under ERISA, however, the federal courts should be cautious not to misuse the concept
and apply it in such a way that it contravenes ERISA's system of claims and remedies under section 502(a). n11 This
claims and remedies system requires that vicarious fiduciary liability must be limited so that a nonfiduciary corporate
principal is not subject to a damages claim under ERISA if an employee or an agent of the principal acts in a "rogue"
manner as a fiduciary with respect to an ERISA plan. If the nonfiduciary corporate principal learns of the rogue
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fiduciary activity, and even knowingly participates in it, section 502(a) of ERISA requires that monetary relief must be
limited to restitution as necessary to prevent unjust enrichment of the principal.
The Article's second claim concerns the doctrinal interpretation of the primary fiduciary duty provisions of section
404(a) n12 and the co-fiduciary duty provisions of section 405 n13 of ERISA. The language of section 405 does not
distinguish between external fiduciaries and internal fiduciaries - employees who act as fiduciaries with respect to their
employer's plan during the course and within the scope of their employment ("internal fiduciary employees"). Read
literally, the co-fiduciary duty provisions of section 405 could be interpreted as permitting an employer to use its
nonfiduciary authority as the creator (in ERISA parlance, the "settlor") of the plan to shield itself from responsibility for
the actions of its own internal fiduciary employees (the "settlor function defense").
The Article's second claim is that section 405 should not be interpreted so that the corporate employer who
sponsors an ERISA plan may design the documents that govern the plan as a shield [*252] against fiduciary liability
for the actions of the employer's own internal fiduciary employees. Just as respondeat superior liability applied to a
corporate trustee under the common law, vicarious fiduciary liability should apply under ERISA. Under a rule of
vicarious fiduciary liability, the corporate employer would be strictly liable for any breach of a section 404(a) fiduciary
duty by an internal fiduciary employee that occurs within the course and scope of employment.
Doctrinally, rejection of the settlor function defense based on a federal common law rule of vicarious fiduciary
liability rests on two other statutory provisions of ERISA - section 404(a)(1)(D) n14 and section 410(a). n15 Section
404(a)(1)(D), one of ERISA's primary fiduciary duties, establishes an ordering rule that requires a fiduciary to disregard
provisions in a plan document that are inconsistent with ERISA's statutory scheme for the regulation of fiduciary
conduct. Section 410(a) reinforces this ordering rule by rendering void as a matter of public policy any exculpatory
clause in a plan document that purports to relieve a fiduciary of its statutory fiduciary duties. In light of these statutory
provisions, section 405 should not be interpreted in such a way as to permit corporate employers to avoid liability for
the actions of their own internal fiduciary employees based on provisions that the employer itself has written into the
plan's governing documents.
Part I of the Article begins by presenting the theoretical justifications for respondent superior liability and the
pre-ERISA liability rules for common law trustees. Part I discusses ERISA's policy goals and compares these goals with
the theoretical justifications for respondeat superior liability. Part I ends with a detailed examination of ERISA's
statutory provisions that impose fiduciary and co-fiduciary duties and "personal" liability upon breaching fiduciaries.
Part I concludes that a federal common law rule of vicarious fiduciary liability is both consistent with ERISA's policy
objectives and the technical statutory provisions that regulate fiduciary conduct.
Part II of the Article addresses whether the civil claims and remedies provisions of section 502(a) are consistent
with a federal common law rule of vicarious fiduciary liability. Part II finds that vicarious fiduciary liability can be
reconciled with the claims and remedies provisions of section 502(a), but that a rule of vicarious fiduciary liability must
be limited so as to avoid transforming claims against nonfiduciary external principals into fiduciary claims. Section
410(a) supports this private ordering rule by rendering void, [*253] as a matter of public policy, exculpatory
provisions in a plan document that purport to relieve fiduciaries from their responsibilities under ERISA.
Part III of the Article proposes two general principles to guide the federal courts in developing a federal common
law rule of vicarious fiduciary liability under ERISA. Part III presents an analytical model, built upon the two general
principles, that emphasizes fiduciary plan structure. Under this model, the federal courts would distinguish between
vicarious fiduciary liability claims brought against external corporate principals and claims brought against employers
for the fiduciary breaches of their own internal employees with respect to the employer's ERISA plan. The Article
concludes with illustrations of how the model may be used to analyze vicarious fiduciary liability claims under ERISA.
I. ERISA Fiduciary Regulation and Vicarious Fiduciary Liability
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A. Respondeat Superior Theory and ERISA Policy Goals
1. The Theoretical Rationales for Respondeat Superior Liability
The Latin phrase respondeat superior, translated literally, means "let the master answer." n16 Judge Richard Posner has
described the modern doctrine of respondeat superior liability as follows:

The liability of an employer for torts committed by its employees - without any fault on [the employer's] part - when
they are acting within the scope of their employment, the liability that the law calls "respondeat superior," is a form of
strict liability. It neither requires the plaintiff to prove fault on the part of the employer nor allows the employer to
exonerate [itself] by proving [its] freedom from fault. n17
Exceptions to an employer's strict liability under the doctrine include torts arising during a "frolic" or "detour" by an
employee [*254] for personal reasons that are outside the scope of employment, n18 or situations where the employer
does not "control" the tortfeasor, as in the case of an independent contractor. n19 If, however, the employer approves or
ratifies an employee's injurious conduct, under the common law respondeat superior liability attaches even though the
employee may have been acting outside the scope of employment. n20
Respondeat superior liability is closely associated with the rise of the modern corporation and enterprise liability.
Corporations are vicariously liable for the actions of their employees when those employees are acting within the
scope of their employment. n22 Corporate liability is based on the principle that a corporation is charged with
knowledge of facts acquired by its officers and agents while these persons act within the course and scope of their
employment. n23 Knowledge of an unauthorized act by the employee, however, is not imputed to the corporation. n24
Therefore, as in the master-servant context, the corporation is not vicariously liable for conduct by an employee that is
outside the scope of employment. n25
n21

Legal scholars have long struggled to justify imposing strict respondeat superior liability. Perhaps the most often
quoted criticism comes from Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, who characterized the doctrine of respondeat superior as
an anomaly that "must be explained by some cause not manifest to common sense alone." n26 [*255] Academic
uneasiness with the doctrine exists largely because of "an inability to identify and defend its precise rationale." n27
Writing in 1916, T. Baty identified no less than nine possible rationales for imposing vicarious liability. n28 Fifty years
later, P.S. Atiyah reviewed Baty's original rationales in light of the complexities of modern society and found that
"some element of truth" remained. n29 Of Baty's nine original rationales for respondeat superior liability, Atiyah
concluded that the following rationales remained viable in modern society:

. Control by the employer over the employee encourages accident prevention by imposing liability upon the person who
has control over the employee's potentially negligent conduct, particularly if the employer cannot insure against the
employee's negligence. n30
. Identification of the servant with the master continues in modern society with the fictitious corporate person, who
must "act" through its officers and employees. n31
. Evidentiary difficulties in identifying and proving that a specific individual is responsible for a tortious act are
even more acute in the modern corporate world. n32
Atiyah's analysis of the ninth Baty rationale - the satisfaction of damages n33 - is particularly germane when considered
in the modern context of ERISA claims and remedies. Baty's original point was that the master is wealthier than the
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servant and therefore is more capable of satisfying a damages award. Atiyah rejected this reasoning as "no justification
at all, when taken by itself." n34 Atiyah then offered a substitute rationale, namely that "where there are other sound
reasons for imposing liability, the law should not be stultified by merely creating academic liabilities which can rarely
be satisfied in [*256] practice." n35 Atiyah's point is noteworthy because it echoes a modern criticism of ERISA's
claims and remedies provisions. This criticism - described by the federal judiciary as "betrayal without a remedy" n36 arises where, as an academic matter, a valid claim exists under ERISA based on a fiduciary's breach of a statutory duty,
but yet ERISA does not provide an adequate remedy. n37
Today, the scholarly rationales for respondeat superior liability are rooted primarily in the law-and-economics
concepts of loss distribution n38 and economic efficiency. n39 Of these two rationales, the economic analysis of Alan
Sykes is most instructive for purposes of comparison with the policy objectives of ERISA's statutory system for
regulating fiduciary conduct. In The Economics of Vicarious Liability, n40 Sykes examines the circumstances under
which a rule imposing vicarious liability upon the principal results in greater economic efficiency than a rule imposing
personal liability on the agent alone. Sykes's theoretical approach is highly instructive in the ERISA setting because
ERISA expressly imposes personal liability upon a breaching fiduciary, but does not expressly create a rule of vicarious
fiduciary liability. n41
The starting point for Sykes's analysis is whether or not the principal and agent can contract to allocate the risks
associated with the agent's performance. n42 Under ERISA, persons are statutorily prohibited from contracting to
exculpate a fiduciary from liability. n43 According to Sykes, where liability cannot be allocated by private contract there
are two factors that determine whether a rule of vicarious liability promotes greater economic efficiency. These two
factors are the risk of insolvency of the agent and the transaction costs to the principal in monitoring the agent's
behavior. n44
[*257] Sykes examines how these two factors operate in a variety of scenarios. One scenario - the tort claimant
who is an involuntary creditor seeking recovery for an injury caused by the agent - is analogous to the ERISA context of
a plan n45 or a plan participant who suffers a loss due to a fiduciary agent's breach of duty. In analyzing this scenario,
Sykes assumes that the principal and the agent are in a multi-period agency relationship (e.g., are employer-employee),
and further assumes that the behavior of the agent is only imperfectly observable and therefore costly for the principal to
monitor. n46 These assumptions are consistent with the circumstances of a corporate employer who uses an internal
fiduciary employee to administer the employer's ERISA plan.
Given these assumptions, Sykes concludes that imposing a rule of vicarious liability is likely to lead to greater
economic efficiency than a rule of personal liability alone. According to Sykes, in situations where the likelihood of
agent insolvency is high, the result of imposing vicarious liability on the principal is "an unambiguous welfare gain." n47
This gain may be offset by the high transaction costs associated with monitoring imperfectly observable agent behavior,
but in a multi-period agency relationship "simple and cheaply administered reward and penalty devices, such as
promotions, bonuses, [and] threats of discharge" can "induce optimal or near-optimal loss-avoidance efforts" by the
agent. n48
Applying Sykes's theoretical analysis to the specific context of ERISA, two additional points bear consideration.
First, Congress considered the risk of fiduciary agent insolvency to be so high that section 412 of ERISA establishes a
bonding requirement to provide a source of funds to replace losses to a plan caused by the fraudulent or dishonest
actions of a fiduciary. n49 The high risk of fiduciary agent insolvency further is confirmed by the very large damage
[*258] awards and settlement amounts for ERISA breach of fiduciary duty claims. n50
Second, ERISA imposes upon any person who appoints a plan fiduciary a duty to monitor the conduct of the
appointed fiduciary. n51 Consequently, imposing a rule of vicarious liability under ERISA would be unlikely to result in
an increase in the monitoring costs associated with the employer's internal fiduciary employees. ERISA already imposes
these monitoring costs upon employers who appoint their own employees as fiduciaries for the employer's plan.
Imposing a rule of vicarious fiduciary liability would reinforce the employer's pre-existing fiduciary duty to monitor by
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making clear that the employer is strictly liable for the actions of its internal fiduciary employees. n52
In summary, Sykes's theoretical analysis indicates that a net welfare gain could result from imposing a rule of
vicarious fiduciary liability under ERISA. Of course, economic efficiency is not the sole, or even the primary, factor for
the Supreme Court to consider in deciding whether to adopt a rule of vicarious fiduciary liability under a federal statute.
n53 But given the voluntary nature of ERISA plan sponsorship, n54 and Congress's desire to minimize costs that could
discourage employers from sponsoring plans for their workers, n55 the theoretical economic impact of a rule of
vicarious fiduciary liability is at least one factor for judicial consideration in determining whether the federal common
law of ERISA should include a rule of vicarious fiduciary liability.
[*259]
2. The Origins of ERISA: Corporate Trustees and Respondeat Superior Liability
The historical context in which Congress crafted and enacted ERISA may partially explain why Congress did not
expressly incorporate a rule of strict vicarious liability when describing a corporate fiduciary's primary duties. n56 At the
time Congress enacted ERISA, regulation of multiemployer plans maintained pursuant to collective bargaining
agreements for unionized employers was the primary focal point for enhanced fiduciary regulation. Congress's
immediate concern was with well-publicized instances of corruption in the management of multiemployer plan assets
by union officials. n57 Significantly, the opportunity for corruption arose because administrative expenses of
multiemployer plans were paid out of the trust assets. This situation presented opportunities for bribery, graft,
kickbacks, and enrichment of persons associated with the administration of the plan and the investment of plan assets.
Thus, in facing the problem of asset mismanagement in multiemployer plans, Congress was addressing a situation that
was analogous to the external agent of a common law trustee who was being compensated out of trust assets.
Multiemployer plans historically have been defined benefit plans. When Congress enacted ERISA in 1974, defined
benefit-style pension plans were the norm. n58 The administration of a defined benefit pension plan typically requires
outside experts, such as actuaries and investment managers or investment advisors, to assist in administering the plan.
ERISA recognized this practice and [*260] expressly permitted outside experts to be paid out of trust assets. n59 Thus,
defined benefit plan administration also paralleled the situation where the external agent of a common law trustee was
being compensated out of trust assets.
The decline of the defined benefit plan and the corresponding rise of the individual account (defined contribution)
plan n60 have changed the norms of plan administration. In a defined contribution plan, all of the assets of the plan are
allocated to individual plan accounts. Although participant accounts may be charged for administrative expenses,
generally the employer who sponsors the plan also pays directly for at least some (if not all) of the plan's administrative
expenses. Defined contribution plans are also relatively easier and less costly for the employer who sponsors the plan to
administer in comparison with defined benefit plans. The less complex design of defined contribution plans allows
corporate employers to rely more heavily on their own internal fiduciary employees to administer the employer's plan.
In designing ERISA's statutory scheme for the regulation of fiduciaries, Congress relied upon the principles of
fiduciary conduct for trustees that had evolved under the common law of trusts. n61 The Supreme Court often turns to
these background principles of trust law when interpreting ERISA's provisions. n62
The liability rules for trustees under the common law created a sharp distinction between "external" agents who
were engaged by the trustee to assist in the administration of the trust and the "internal" officers and employees of a
corporate trustee. n63 The Restatement (Second) of Trusts ("Restatement") describes the general rule as "the trustee is
not liable to the [trust] beneficiary for the acts of agents employed by him in the administration of the [*261] trust." n64
The Restatement, however, defines the phrase "agents employed by him in the administration of the trust" in a unique
way as limited to "only such agents as are employed in connection with the administration of the trust and whose
compensation can properly be paid out of the trust property." n65 This definition excludes from the general rule
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situations where the loss to the trust is caused by an internal officer or employee of a corporate trustee. n66
Under the general rule described above, state law courts found that a trustee was personally liable to a trust
beneficiary for the losses to the trust caused by the acts of an "external" agent only if the trustee was guilty of "supine
negligence" n67 in selecting, directing, monitoring, or supervising the agent. n68 Thus, the general rule required fault by
the trustee before the trustee would be liable to the trust beneficiaries for losses to the trust assets caused by the external
agent's intentional or negligent conduct. n69
For a corporate trustee, however, the common law of trusts created an important exception to the general rule that a
trustee is not liable to the trust beneficiaries for losses to the trust caused by the acts of an agent. Under this exception, a
rule of strict liability without fault applied to corporate trustees for the actions of their internal officers or employees
that were within the scope of employment. The common law's justification for imposing strict respondeat superior
liability upon a corporate trustee was that the corporation necessarily must carry on its trust business through its officers
and employees. Therefore, the corporation must assume responsibility for the actions of its employees in administering
the trust. n70
Modernly, this exception imposing respondeat superior liability for corporate trustees has been recognized and
applied by the U.S. [*262] Supreme Court. In Mosser v. Darrow, n71 the Supreme Court rejected the fault-based
"supine negligence" standard under Pennsylvania state law for trustee liability under the general liability rule, and
instead imposed a rule of strict vicarious liability for the acts of the corporate trustee's employees because these actions
were within the scope of their employment:

It is argued here, and appears to have been the view of the Court of Appeals, that principles of negligence applied and
that a trustee could not be surcharged under many decisions unless guilty of "supine negligence." We see no room for
the operation of the principles of negligence in a case in which conduct [by employees of the trustee] has been
knowingly authorized. This is not the case of a trustee betrayed by those he had grounds to believe were trustworthy, for
these employees did exactly what it was agreed by the trustee that they should do. The question whether [the trustee]
was negligent in not making detailed inquiries into [the employees'] operations is unimportant, because [the trustee] had
given a blanket authority for the operations. n72
ERISA closely tracks the fault-based general rule of section 225 of the Restatement when one fiduciary allocates or
delegates fiduciary responsibilities to another external fiduciary pursuant to a formal arrangement in the plan document.
n73 But Congress did not explicitly incorporate into ERISA the common law rule of strict vicarious liability when
describing a corporate fiduciary's primary duties under section 404(a), n74 or in describing the "personal" liability
imposed on a fiduciary for breach of an ERISA duty under section 409(a). n75
Given these historical norms for pension plan design and administration, it is not surprising that Congress failed to
address expressly whether ERISA incorporated the corporate trustee-based exception that created a rule of strict
vicarious fiduciary liability. The question simply was not at the forefront of the immediate problems of trust asset
mismanagement in the multiemployer and defined benefit plan context that Congress sought to resolve through ERISA's
fiduciary responsibilities provisions.
[*263]
3. From the Common Law Trustee Model to ERISA
The paradigm Congress used to address problems of fiduciary corruption and asset mismanagement was the common
law of trusts, n76 a structure that was already in use for pre-ERISA employee benefit plans. n77 Thus, the starting point
for ERISA regulation became the requirement that "all assets of an employee benefit plan shall be held in trust by one
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or more trustees." n78 In building upon the pre-existing trust paradigm, Congress purposefully expanded the traditional
role of the common law trustee into the concept of an ERISA fiduciary. As the Supreme Court explained in Mertens v.
Hewitt Associates: n79

Under traditional trust law, although a beneficiary could obtain damages from third persons for knowing participation in
a trustee's breach of fiduciary duties, only the trustee had fiduciary duties. ERISA, however, defines "fiduciary" not in
terms of formal trusteeship, but in functional terms of control and authority over the plan, thus expanding the universe
of persons subject to fiduciary duties - and to damages - under [ERISA]. n80
The trustee-based model of the common law focused the risk of misappropriation or mismanagement of trust assets on
the trustee. ERISA's broader universe of fiduciaries expanded the managerial risks associated with employee benefit
plans by granting multiple persons the authority to administer and manage the plan and to control and invest the plan's
assets. In moving from a one-dimensional trustee model to a multi-dimensional fiduciary model, Congress did not
attempt to anticipate and address all of the potential complications. n81 One of the omitted details was whether the
common law liability rule of respondeat superior liability for corporate [*264] trustees would become part of ERISA's
system for regulating the conduct of corporate fiduciaries.
Given the lack of legislative guidance, three lines of further inquiry seem appropriate. First, is vicarious fiduciary
liability consistent with the overarching policy goals of ERISA? This question is addressed in the next section of the
Article. Second, is vicarious fiduciary liability consistent with ERISA's technical statutory provisions that regulate
fiduciary conduct? Part I.B of the Article examines this second question. Third, is vicarious fiduciary liability consistent
with ERISA's statutory scheme authorizing claims and remedies? This third question is addressed in Part II of the
Article.
4. Comparing ERISA Policy Goals with the Theoretical Justifications for Respondeat Superior Liability
The Supreme Court has identified both a primary policy objective and a secondary policy objective for ERISA.
ERISA's primary policy objective is to protect the rights of plan participants and their promised plan benefits (the
"protective policy"). n82 ERISA's secondary policy objective is to avoid discouraging employers from voluntarily
sponsoring benefit plans for their workers by minimizing the administrative burdens and related costs associated with
plan sponsorship (the "cost containment policy"). n83 In crafting ERISA, Congress attempted to strike a balance
between these two sometimes-competing policy goals. n84
ERISA's protective policy is reflected in the rules governing fiduciary conduct set forth in sections 404 and 405 of
ERISA. n85 Under these rules, a fiduciary is personally responsible for a breach of fiduciary duty and jointly and
severally liable for a breach of co-fiduciary duty. n86 Another set of rules, found in section 406, prohibits [*265]
certain types of transactions involving plan assets that historically presented the opportunity for misuse and self-dealing.
n87 Finally, the bonding requirement of section 412 protects plan participants against losses to the plan assets that secure
promised benefits. n88
Another important provision that promotes ERISA's protective policy is section 410(a). n89 Section 410(a)
eliminates the common law practice of relieving the trustee from liability by including an exculpatory clause in the trust
agreement. n90 Under section 410(a), "any provision in an agreement or instrument which purports to relieve a fiduciary
from responsibility or liability for any responsibility, obligation, or duty under this part [4 of title I of ERISA] shall be
void as against public policy." n91 The Department of Labor interprets section 410(a) as further prohibiting the
indemnification of a fiduciary using plan assets because "such an arrangement would have the same result as an
exculpatory clause, in that it would, in effect, relieve the fiduciary of responsibility and liability to the plan by
abrogating the plan's right to recovery from the fiduciary for breaches of fiduciary obligations." n92 The combination of
ERISA's prohibition on exculpatory clauses and the restrictions on using plan assets to indemnify fiduciaries addresses
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the problem of moral hazard n93 that arises under ERISA due to the high risk of agent insolvency. n94
ERISA's cost containment policy is reflected in ERISA's broad preemption of state laws under section 514(a), the
written plan document rule of section 402, and the limitations on the remedies available against nonfiduciary plan
service providers under section 502(a). Section 514(a) broadly preempts "any and all State laws [*266] insofar as they
may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan." n95 Federal preemption relieves plan administrators of the
burden of complying with state regulation, particularly for national or regional plans that operate in more than one
jurisdiction. n96 Plan administration also is less burdensome when fiduciaries can rely with certainty on the terms of the
written document that establishes the plan and ignore conflicting state laws. In its more recent preemption cases, the
Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that ERISA preempts state laws that would interfere with the terms of the
plan that govern core administrative functions. n97
To define these core administrative functions, the Supreme Court has looked to section 402. Section 402 requires
that every plan must be established and maintained pursuant to a written instrument, and further describes the
mandatory and optional written provisions concerning plan administration that are to be contained in the plan's
governing document. n98 Functions that fall within the mandatory or optional plan provisions described in section 402
are considered by the Supreme Court to be core administrative functions that are not subject to potentially conflicting
state laws or regulations. n99
Section 402 is particularly important to ERISA's cost containment policy because of the reliance interest that
employers and plan administrators have with respect to the design of the governing plan document. Significantly, one
core administrative function protected under the umbrella of section 402 concerns plan provisions that allocate fiduciary
responsibilities. n100 These plan-based procedures for allocating fiduciary responsibility for the overall management and
operation of the plan form the backbone of modern plan administration.
Even though the written plan document rule of section 402 supports ERISA's cost containment policy, the
protective policy nevertheless remains paramount. This ordering rule is reflected in section 404(a)(1)(D). Section
404(a)(1)(D) provides that although [*267] in general a fiduciary must discharge fiduciary duties in accordance with
the terms of the written plan document, a fiduciary is required to disregard any plan document term that is inconsistent
with a statutory provision of ERISA. n101 Thus, for example, a plan fiduciary would have an affirmative duty under
section 404(a)(1)(D) to disregard a plan term that directly or indirectly exculpates a fiduciary from ERISA liability in
violation of section 410(a).
The third statutory basis for the cost containment policy is found in section 502(a), n102 which establishes the civil
claims and remedies available under ERISA. Section 502(a), which is discussed in detail later in Part II of the Article, is
critically important due to ERISA's general preemption of state law claims and remedies that relate to an employee
benefit plan. In terms of available remedies, section 502(a) draws a sharp line between defendants who are ERISA
fiduciaries and defendants who are not ERISA fiduciaries, such as persons who provide nonfiduciary professional
services to a [*268] plan. Fiduciary defendants are subject to damages claims under section 502(a); nonfiduciary
defendants are not. n103 By eliminating the potential for damages claims against nonfiduciary professional plan service
providers, Congress avoided imposing "high insurance costs upon persons who regularly deal with and offer advice to
ERISA plans, and hence upon ERISA plans themselves." n104
Viewed from a policy perspective, the theoretical justifications for imposing respondeat superior liability are
consistent with the objectives of ERISA's protective policy. The traditional common law justifications for imposing
respondeat superior liability all served to make it easier for an individual to recover damages for injuries due to the tort
or negligence of an agent who was acting within the scope of employment. In the ERISA context, the claim (breach of a
statutory fiduciary duty) may be different, but the underlying evidentiary problems of proving fault, causation of injury,
and recouping losses remain the same.
The economic benefits of imposing respondeat superior liability in the ERISA context are not easily quantified due
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to a lack of empirical data on utility gains and the transaction costs of monitoring agent conduct. But the two theoretical
conditions that would result in a net welfare gain from imposing vicarious liability in the principal-agent setting are at
least consistent with the circumstances of ERISA fiduciaries. Internal fiduciary employees are at high risk of insolvency
due to potentially very large damages and settlement awards resulting from ERISA breach of fiduciary duty claims, and
ERISA requires corporate employers to monitor the conduct of their internal fiduciary employees.
What is less clear is whether the justifications for respondeat superior liability can be reconciled with ERISA's
secondary cost containment policy. Given the large dollar amounts at stake in ERISA fiduciary litigation, corporations
may be deterred from voluntarily sponsoring ERISA plans without well-defined boundaries and limitations on the scope
of an employer's strict liability. Similarly, external corporate fiduciaries and external nonfiduciary service providers
who assist employers in administering and operating their ERISA plans may increase the fees for their services if the
parameters of vicarious fiduciary liability are ill-defined and therefore difficult to monitor and control.
Closer examination reveals another policy dilemma. If imposing vicarious fiduciary liability makes corporate
employers the proverbial deep pocket for the misconduct of internal fiduciary [*269] employees, then employers are
likely to respond by engaging in tactics to protect corporate assets from fiduciary liability. Such tactics, if sanctioned by
the federal courts, would undermine ERISA's protective policy because the section 412 bonding requirement alone may
be inadequate to restore losses to the plan caused by a fiduciary's breach of duty. n105 Without the financial backstop
provided by the corporate assets of the plan's sponsoring employer, the employer's plan may not be fully compensated
for the losses caused by an internal fiduciary employee.
Employers today are, in fact, utilizing such tactics to protect corporate assets. n106 These tactics are based on the
settlor function defense, a doctrine first adopted by the Supreme Court in Curtiss-Wright v. Schoonejongen n107 and
further developed in Lockheed Corp. v. Spink n108 and Hughes Aircraft v. Jacobson. n109 Distilled to its essence, the
settlor function defense rests on the premise that corporate-level fiduciary liability may be avoided by designing the
plan document so that fiduciary responsibilities are allocated to internal employees rather than to the corporate
employer who sponsors the plan. n110 Whether the settlor function defense will be successful in shielding corporate
employers from ERISA fiduciary liability is an unresolved question. The answer will depend in large part on whether
the federal courts develop a federal common law rule of vicarious fiduciary liability.
B. Vicarious Fiduciary Liability Claims and the Statutory Regulation of Fiduciaries
Even if a federal common law rule of vicarious fiduciary liability is consistent with ERISA's policy objectives, "vague
notions of a statute's "basic purpose' are nonetheless inadequate to overcome the words of its text regarding the specific
issue under consideration." n111 This part of the Article examines the statutory language of ERISA that regulates
fiduciary conduct.
[*270]
1. Functional Fiduciaries and Named Fiduciaries

In any case involving an alleged breach of fiduciary duty, the threshold issue is whether the defendant was acting in a
fiduciary capacity with respect to the plan when the allegedly wrongful actions occurred (or was wearing a
"non-fiduciary" hat instead). n112
Fiduciary responsibilities are rooted in ERISA's definition of a "fiduciary" and the unique role that the "named
fiduciary" plays in the management and administration of an ERISA plan. ERISA's general definition of a fiduciary is
noteworthy because the definition expressly limits fiduciary status "to the extent" of the particular fiduciary functions
performed. n113 Consequently, the same person can act as a fiduciary when performing some tasks, and yet not be a
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fiduciary when performing other nonfiduciary tasks. n114 Second, ERISA's definition of a fiduciary focuses on the
functions actually performed rather than on the person's official title. n115 Thus, a person can be a fiduciary under
ERISA without even knowing or intending to be a fiduciary. n116 Third, the word "administration" as used in the
definition of an ERISA fiduciary includes not only the exercise of any powers expressly so provided in the plan
document, but also broadly includes any "activities that are "ordinary and natural means' of achieving the "objective' of
the plan." n117 Thus, activities such as communicating with plan participants about their plan benefits are fiduciary acts
of plan administration, even though such activities may not be expressly described or authorized in the plan's governing
document. n118
Under ERISA's definition of a fiduciary, persons who provide products or professional services [*271] to assist in
plan administration, such as accounting, actuarial, legal, or investment education services ("nonfiduciary plan service
providers") normally are not plan fiduciaries. n119 For example, an insurance company is not a fiduciary with respect to
a plan simply because it sells its insurance products, such as group life insurance, group health care insurance, or group
long term disability insurance, to provide plan benefits. n120 Nor is an attorney or an actuary who advises the plan's
sponsor concerning legal or actuarial questions a fiduciary with respect to the plan. n121
In some instances, however, an individual employee or agent of a nonfiduciary plan service provider may step
beyond his or her authorized role of providing products or professional services and instead assume fiduciary
responsibilities with respect to a client's ERISA plan. n122 In these instances of unauthorized or "rogue" fiduciary
conduct, the federal courts have been unable to agree whether the insurance company or brokerage firm who is
associated with the rogue agent can be sued under ERISA for a breach of fiduciary duty based on a federal common law
rule of vicarious fiduciary liability. n123
ERISA's definition of a fiduciary uses the generic term "person" to describe the fiduciary actor. ERISA defines a
"person" broadly to include both individuals and a variety of legal entities, including corporations, partnerships, and
joint ventures. n124 Thus, the definition of a fiduciary "person" necessarily raises the question of how a corporation
"acts" as a fiduciary and the related question of vicarious fiduciary liability based on the actions of a corporation's
officers and employees.
[*272] Although the Supreme Court has never addressed explicitly the question of whether ERISA incorporates
common law principles of vicarious liability, the analysis in Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Schoonejongen n125 provides some
indication of how - if faced with the question directly - the Court might resolve it. In Curtiss-Wright, the plan document
authorized "the Company" to amend the terms of a retiree health care plan, but the plan document did not clearly
specify a procedure by which "the Company" could amend the plan. This lack of specificity was problematic because
section 402(b)(3) requires that every plan document must provide a procedure for amending the plan. n126 When the
company later amended the plan to terminate the health care benefits for certain retirees, the retirees challenged the
termination based on the lack of a proper amendment procedure in the retiree health care plan document. The Supreme
Court reasoned that

in order for an amendment procedure that says the plan may be amended by "the Company" to make any sense, there
must be some way of determining what it means for "the Company" to make a decision to amend... . After all, only
natural persons are capable of making decisions... . Principles of corporate law provide a ready-made set of rules for
determining, in whatever context, who has authority to make decisions on behalf of a company. Consider, for example,
an ordinary sales contract between "Company X" and a third party. We would not think of regarding the contract as
meaningless, and thus unenforceable, simply because it does not specify on its face exactly who within "Company X"
has the power to enter into such an agreement or carry out its terms. Rather, we would look to corporate law principles
to give "Company X" content. So too here. n127
One year after Curtiss-Wright was decided, the Supreme Court addressed a breach of fiduciary duty claim brought
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against a corporate employer in Varity Corp. v. Howe. n128 The plaintiffs, a class of former employees, claimed that the
corporate employer had committed a breach of fiduciary duty based on misleading [*273] communications concerning
the future security of their health care plan benefits made to them by an officer of the corporation. n129 The corporate
employer's defense was that the officer's communications to plan participants were not fiduciary in nature. The Varity
Court held that the communications by the corporate officer were a fiduciary act of plan "administration" and, therefore,
the corporate employer had engaged in a breach of fiduciary duty by lying to the plan participants. n130
The issue in Varity of vicarious fiduciary liability on the part of the corporate employer was not raised directly by
either the plaintiffs or by the corporate employer defendant. But portions of the Varity Court's reasoning strongly
suggest that vicarious fiduciary liability was an underlying assumption in the Court's decision:

We conclude, therefore, that the factual context in which the statements were made, combined with the plan-related
nature of the activity, engaged in by those who had plan-related authority to do so, together provide sufficient support
for the District Court's legal conclusion that [the corporation] was acting as a fiduciary. n131
In Varity, the corporate employer was the plan's named fiduciary, thereby placing the officer of the company in the
awkward position of speaking as both on behalf of the corporate employer and as the plan's administrator. n132 ERISA
requires that every plan must have at least one fiduciary (the "named fiduciary") who has overall authority to control
and manage the operation and administration of the plan. A named fiduciary is a specialized subset of the broader
category of functional ERISA fiduciaries under section 3(21)(A). The purpose of the named fiduciary requirement is to
inform the participants in the plan who is responsible for the overall operation and management of the plan and its
assets. n133
With regard to ERISA fiduciary liability, the role of the named fiduciary is unique. Under ERISA, the default rule
is that the plan's named fiduciary is liable for the entire operation and administration [*274] of the ERISA plan. n134 In
order for a named fiduciary to curtail this unlimited liability for the overall operation and administration of the plan, the
plan document formally must set forth a procedure whereby the plan's named fiduciary (or named fiduciaries) allocate
or delegate their unlimited fiduciary responsibilities to other fiduciaries. n135 If a named fiduciary utilizes such a formal
allocation or designation procedure, the named fiduciary does not escape fiduciary liability for the allocated or
designated fiduciary functions entirely. Rather, the scope of the named fiduciary's potential liability for the allocated or
designated functions ranges from unlimited strict liability to a more narrow brand of fault-based co-fiduciary liability
under section 405 of ERISA. n136
The outcome in Varity powerfully illustrated to corporate America the perils of having the corporate employer
serve as the named fiduciary for the employer's ERISA plan. Since Varity, corporate employers have focused more
carefully on their plan documents in an attempt to insulate corporate assets from breach of fiduciary duty claims through
utilization of a technique that is based on the Supreme Court's settlor function doctrine. Under the settlor function
doctrine, when designing or amending the terms of the plan the corporate employer who sponsors the plan acts in a
nonfiduciary "settlor" capacity and not as a fiduciary. n137 Thus, in designing the terms of the plan the corporate
employer does not owe fiduciary duties to the plan's participants, but rather may design the terms of the plan to benefit
the corporate employer.
Based on the settlor function doctrine, the corporate employer may design the plan so that a committee composed
of individual officers and employees (rather than the corporate employer itself) is designated as the named fiduciary for
the employer's ERISA plan. n138 The purpose of this plan design is to protect the corporate [*275] employer from
ERISA fiduciary liability. If a breach of fiduciary duty is alleged with respect to the employer's plan, the corporate
employer's "settlor function" defense is that the committee, not the corporate employer, is liable because the committee
is the named fiduciary under the plan document.
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In creating the settlor function doctrine, the Supreme Court acknowledged that the doctrine does not provide
immunity to the plan's administrator from the primary fiduciary duties of section 404(a) related to the administrator's
implementation or enforcement of the terms of the plan. n139 The primary fiduciary duties of section 404(a), and its
potential for a federal common law rule of vicarious fiduciary liability, are explored in the next section of the Article.
2. Fiduciary Duties and "Personal" Liability
ERISA's fiduciary duty provisions reflect the statute's protective policy. Section 404(a) of ERISA creates four primary
duties that apply to all plan fiduciaries. Section 405 of ERISA imposes additional co-fiduciary duties when a plan has
more than one fiduciary. Breach of a fiduciary or a co-fiduciary duty results in "personal" liability for the breaching
fiduciary under section 409(a) of ERISA.
Corporate employers always have used the terms of the written plan document in conjunction with the provisions of
section 405 to limit the employer's potential co-fiduciary liability for the actions of an external co-fiduciary. More
recently, however, employers are seeking to use the plan's design, in conjunction with section 405, to protect corporate
assets from the actions of their own internal fiduciary employees. This section examines these developments in plan
document design and concludes that a federal common law rule of vicarious fiduciary liability is necessary to prevent
abuse of the settlor function doctrine by corporate employers.
a. Primary Fiduciary Duties Under Section 404(a)
Section 404(a)(1) of ERISA establishes four primary duties that govern the conduct of all fiduciaries. Under section
404(a)(1)(A), a fiduciary generally must discharge his duties with respect to a [*276] plan solely in the interest of the
plan's participants and beneficiaries and for the exclusive purpose of providing plan benefits to them. n140 Section
404(a)(1)(B) requires the fiduciary to discharge his duties with the "care, skill, prudence and diligence under the
circumstances then prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters would use in
the conduct of an enterprise of like character and with like aims." n141
Section 404(a)(1)(C) requires a fiduciary to diversify the investments of the plan prudently under the circumstances
so as to minimize the risk of large losses, unless under the circumstances it is clearly imprudent to do so. n142 The duty
of prudent diversification is designed to prevent the fiduciary from concentrating the investment of the plan's assets in a
single type of investment, geographic location, or industry. n143 Significantly, ERISA exempts individual account plans
from this duty of prudent diversification with respect to the acquisition or holding of company stock that constitutes
qualifying employer securities. n144 Consequently, participants in pension plans may concentrate their account
investments in company stock.
Section 404(a)(1)(D) requires a fiduciary to discharge his fiduciary duties in accordance with the documents
governing the plan, but only insofar as such documents are consistent with the other statutory provisions of ERISA. n145
Section 404(a)(1)(D) is an ordering rule that prevents employer abuse of the nonfiduciary settlor function in designing
the terms of the plan. Although the employer acts as a settlor and not as a fiduciary when designing the terms of the
plan, the employer acts as a fiduciary when the employer administers the terms of the plan. n146 Thus, the ordering rule
of section 404(a)(1)(D) provides an important check on potential employer overreaching under the settlor function
doctrine by requiring that the employer (or the employer-selected plan administrator) must disregard any terms of the
plan that would be contrary to the statutory provisions of ERISA.
[*277] Although Congress generally intended section 404(a) to codify the principles of fiduciary conduct
developed under the common law of trusts, certain modifications were necessary for employee benefit plans. n147 One
of these modifications - the ban on exculpatory clauses under section 410(a) - has already been discussed. Two other
relevant modifications are the relaxation of the common law's strict duty of loyalty for fiduciary trustees, and the
authorization of multiple fiduciaries beyond a trustee for the plan. Both modifications have implications for a federal
common law rule of vicarious fiduciary liability.
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The common law of trusts imposed a strict undivided duty of loyalty upon the trustee that categorically barred the
trustee from self-dealing with trust assets or engaging in transactions involving trust property where the trustee's
judgment might be influenced or tainted by a conflict of interest. n148 ERISA modified this strict common law duty of
loyalty. Section 408(c)(3) of ERISA permits an officer or employee of the employer who sponsors the plan
simultaneously to serve as a plan fiduciary. n149 It is this modification to the common law of trusts that makes an
internal fiduciary employee possible. By modifying the undivided duty of loyalty imposed by the common law of trusts,
Congress permitted fiduciaries who are also officers or employees of the employer that sponsors the plan to operate
under a potential conflict of interest. Even though an internal fiduciary employee remains subject to the fiduciary duties
of section 404(a), n150 and when serving in a fiduciary capacity must act with an "eye single" to the interests of the
plan's participants and beneficiaries, n151 the potential for biased judgment in favor of the employer can generate claims
of breach of fiduciary duty. Varity illustrates this type of conflict of interest.
The second modification to the common law of trusts relates to ERISA's expanded concept of a fiduciary. Under
the common law of trusts, the only fiduciary was the trustee of the trust. Under [*278] ERISA, at a minimum a plan
must have a trustee n152 and at least one named fiduciary, n153 but an ERISA plan may (and often does) have multiple
fiduciaries. n154 Any person - whether or not a named fiduciary of the plan - who has the power to appoint or retain a
person who will perform fiduciary functions with respect to the plan acts as a fiduciary when exercising these
appointment and retention powers. n155 As part of a fiduciary's general duty of prudence, such an appointing fiduciary
has an ongoing fiduciary duty to periodically review the appointed fiduciary's performance for compliance with the
terms of the plan and ERISA's statutory requirements and standards. This fiduciary responsibility is known as the "duty
to monitor." n156 The duty to monitor further requires that the appointing fiduciary must exercise due care when
delegating fiduciary tasks to other fiduciaries n157 and when selecting and overseeing persons who provide nonfiduciary
services to the plan or its participants. n158
Under the duty to monitor, the power of a corporate employer to hire or fire its own internal fiduciary employees is
a fiduciary function that makes the corporate employer a fiduciary. Thus, even if the corporate employer who sponsors
the plan is not designated in the plan's governing document as a named fiduciary, the corporate employer nevertheless is
a fiduciary to the extent of the duty to monitor.
[*279]
b. The Employer's Duty to Monitor and Co-Fiduciary Duties Under Section 405
The corporate employer's duty to monitor raises a difficult characterization issue in the context of a vicarious fiduciary
liability claim. This characterization issue is most easily understood by comparing the corporate employer's duty to
monitor an external fiduciary with the duty to monitor an internal fiduciary employee.
For the purposes of illustration, assume that the corporate employer who sponsors the plan is also the named
fiduciary for the plan. Further assume that the plan document contains a procedure by which the employer may allocate
or delegate its responsibility for the plan as the named fiduciary. The corporate employer utilizes the plan's procedure
and appoints an external fiduciary to administer the plan. In this situation, the corporate employer and the appointed
external fiduciary are separate legal persons. They are co-fiduciaries with respect to each other.
Now assume that instead of appointing an external fiduciary to administer the plan, the corporate employer hires an
employee to administer the plan for the employer (the "Plan Administrator"). Should the corporate employer and the
Plan Administrator be characterized as separate legal persons, in other words, as co-fiduciaries? Or, should the Plan
Administer be characterized as an employee who acts on behalf of the corporate employer?
The potential legal consequences that flow from this fundamental characterization issue are highly significant. If
the corporate employer and the internal fiduciary employee are characterized as co-fiduciaries, then traditional
respondeat superior principles do not apply, and the employer is subject to liability for the fiduciary misconduct of the
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employee only if the employer is shown to be at fault, either due to a breach of the fiduciary duty to monitor the
employee or due to a breach of the co-fiduciary duty provisions of section 405. But if the internal fiduciary employee is
characterized as acting on behalf of the corporate employer when engaging in fiduciary misconduct, then under
traditional respondeat superior principles the employer would be strictly liable for any breach of a primary section
404(a) fiduciary duty by the employee.
This characterization issue carries with it important implications for ERISA's protective policy. Quite simply, if the
federal courts characterize the internal fiduciary employee as a separate fiduciary apart from the employer, then the
corporate employer can, by clever plan drafting, circumvent the co-fiduciary duties of [*280] section 405 and thereby
limit the employer's potential liability. This result flows from ERISA's intricate rules for allocating fiduciary
responsibilities. These rules introduced in section 402 and fully developed in section 405 of ERISA.
Section 402(b)(2) requires that any procedure for allocating or delegating fiduciary responsibilities for the
administration of the plan must be specified in the plan document itself, "including any procedures described in section
1105(c)(1) of this title [section 405(c)(1) of ERISA]." n159 Section 405(c)(1) of ERISA provides:

The instrument under which a plan is maintained may expressly provide for procedures (A) for allocating fiduciary
responsibilities (other than trustee responsibilities) among named fiduciaries, and (B) for named fiduciaries to designate
persons other than named fiduciaries to carry out fiduciary responsibilities (other than trustee responsibilities) under the
plan. n160
For the remainder of the Article, when fiduciary responsibilities are allocated among named fiduciaries or designated to
be performed on behalf of a named fiduciary by other fiduciaries using a procedure expressly described in the plan
document, this procedure is referred to as a "formal 405(c) arrangement."
If a named fiduciary allocates or delegates its fiduciary responsibilities pursuant to a formal 405(c) arrangement,
then the co-fiduciary liability of the named fiduciary for the acts or omissions of the persons to whom fiduciary
responsibilities have been allocated or delegated is limited to the fault-based circumstances described in section 405(a)
and section 405(c)(2)(A). n161 Absent utilization of a formal 405(c) arrangement, the default liability rule under ERISA
is that the plan's named fiduciary is strictly liable for the performance of all fiduciary responsibilities, even those
responsibilities that may have been informally allocated or delegated to other persons. n162 This default liability rule for
named fiduciaries provides a very strong incentive for the inclusion of a formal 405(c) arrangement in the plan
document. By utilizing a formal 405(c) arrangement, the named fiduciary can replace strict liability with fault-based
co-fiduciary liability under the general rules of section 405(a) and the more specialized rules of section 405(c)(2)(A),
which apply to named fiduciaries.
[*281] Section 405(a) establishes three general rules for fault-based co-fiduciary liability: (1) if the fiduciary
"participates knowingly in, or knowingly undertakes to conceal, an act or omission of such other fiduciary, knowing
such act or omission is a breach"; (2) if the fiduciary fails to comply with 404(a)(1) and enables another fiduciary to
commit a breach; or (3) if the fiduciary "has knowledge of a breach by such other fiduciary," and makes no reasonable
effort to remedy the breach. n163
Notably, the second general rule of section 405(a)(2) does not require any knowledge of the fiduciary's breach of
duty. n164 Under section 405(a)(2), a co-fiduciary is jointly and severally liable for another fiduciary's breach if there is
a causal connection between the co-fiduciary's own breach of fiduciary duty under section 404(a)(1) "in the
administration of his specific responsibilities which give rise to his status as a fiduciary" and the harm or injury caused
by the other fiduciary's breach. n165 Co-fiduciary breaches under section 405(a)(2) typically flow from the fiduciary's
own duty of prudence, particularly the duty to monitor appointed fiduciaries, in administering the plan. n166
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Section 405(a)(2) provides a basis for contrast in interpreting the "knowledge" element of sections 405(a)(1) and
405(a)(3) precisely because section 405(a)(2) contains no knowledge requirement. Under section 405(a)(2), a
co-fiduciary who lacks "knowledge" of another fiduciary's breach of duty nevertheless is jointly and severally liable if
the co-fiduciary failed to comply with [*282] his own direct fiduciary duties under section 404(a) and thereby enabled
the other fiduciary's breach of duty to occur. If an imputed knowledge based on strict vicarious fiduciary liability were
to satisfy the "knowledge" element of sections 405(a)(1) and 405(a)(3), then these provisions would swallow up section
405(a)(2) and render it meaningless. The better reading of section 405(a) is one that gives independent meaning to each
of its three subsections. Read together as a whole, the three general rules of co-fiduciary liability under section 405(a)
embrace a fault-based liability concept and reject the type of strict liability that would flow from imputing knowledge
based on vicarious fiduciary liability.
This reading of section 405(a) as rejecting a federal common law rule of vicarious liability as between separate
persons who are co-fiduciaries is further supported by section 405(c)(2), which applies only to named fiduciaries. The
language of section 405(c)(2) closely parallels the language of the Restatement (Second) of Trusts, which describes the
general rule of trustee liability under the common law of trusts. n167 Absent a breach of the common law trustee's own
fiduciary duties in selecting, directing, monitoring, or supervising an external agent, the trustee was not personally liable
for losses to the trust caused by an external agent who was compensated using trust assets.
But did Congress intend subsection 405(c)(2) to supersede the trust law rule of respondeat superior liability for the
internal employees of a corporate fiduciary? And, does section 405(c)(2) negate the possibility of a federal common law
rule of vicarious fiduciary liability under section 404(a)?
To answer these questions, there is one final component of ERISA's regulatory scheme that must be reviewed,
namely the concept of "personal" liability for a breach of a primary fiduciary duty under section 404(a). In the context
of other federal statutes, the Supreme Court has been willing to impose a federal common law rule of vicarious liability
upon corporate "persons" based on respondeat superior principles. Although each federal statute is unique, examining
other instances where the Supreme Court has recognized a rule of vicarious liability provides insight into whether the
federal common law of ERISA includes vicarious fiduciary liability.
[*283]
c.
"Personal" Liability and the Interference of Vicarious Liability When Interpreting Federal Statutes
Section 409(a) imposes liability upon persons who are fiduciaries. ERISA defines a "person" to include both
individuals and corporations. n168 Thus, "personal" liability under section 409(a) could include vicarious liability. n169
In Meyer v. Holley, n170 the Supreme Court faced a similar statutory interpretation dilemma in the context of the
federal Fair Housing Act. The Supreme Court held that as a matter of federal common law the Fair Housing Act
incorporated principles of vicarious liability. n171 Given the close similarities in the statutory language, n172 and the
relatively close proximity in time between the enactment of the Fair Housing Act and ERISA, n173 the Supreme Court's
reasoning in Meyer is instructive.
Unlike the Fair Housing Act, in enacting ERISA Congress legislated against a background of trust law, not tort law.
But this background of trust law included the principle that a corporate trustee was subject to respondeat superior
liability for damages to the trust that resulted from the misconduct of the corporate [*284] trustee's own employees.
Given this trust law background, it would not be unreasonable to infer, as the Supreme Court did in Meyer, that
Congress intended to incorporate the concept of vicarious fiduciary liability into ERISA.
d. Vicarious Fiduciary Liability Claims and the Employer Settlor Function Defense
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Corporate employers may use the settlor function to form a double layer of protection against fiduciary liability claims.
To illustrate this liability avoidance technique, assume that the named fiduciary (whether an individual employee or a
committee composed of corporate officers and employees) designates other internal employees to perform the duties of
a named fiduciary using a formal 405(c) arrangement, and that these designated internal fiduciary employees perform
their fiduciary duties during the course and within the scope of their employment with the employer. This
double-layered fiduciary plan structure, which is illustrated in the diagram below, makes the corporate employer two
structural steps removed from the internal fiduciary employee who commits a breach of fiduciary duty with respect to
the employer's ERISA plan.
Today, this type of double-layered fiduciary plan structure is far from hypothetical. The trend of recent lower
federal court decisions reflects this double-layered plan fiduciary structure. n174 In the wake of the Supreme Court's
decision in Varity, employers began using the settlor function doctrine in conjunction with this double-layered plan
fiduciary structure to avoid corporate-level liability, particularly where the employer's plan holds company stock as a
plan asset.
[*285]
Diagram A
The Double-Layered Fiduciary Plan Structure
[SEE DIAGRAM A IN ORIGINAL]
The starting point for judicial analysis of the settlor function defense should be the fundamental characterization issue
that lies at the heart of the double-layered plan fiduciary structure. The federal courts should begin by recognizing that
the traditional corporate law principle of respondeat superior applies as federal common law under ERISA. Under a
federal common law rule of vicarious fiduciary liability, the corporate employer is strictly liable under section 404(a)
for the fiduciary conduct of its own internal employees who act as fiduciaries with respect to the employer's plan during
the course and within the scope of their employment. Recognizing vicarious fiduciary liability as a federal common law
rule is consistent with the pre-ERISA background of trust law, which imposed respondeat superior liability upon
corporate trustees. Vicarious fiduciary liability is consistent with the statutory definition of a "person" and the
imposition of "personal" fiduciary [*286] liability under section 409(a). In interpreting ERISA in Curtiss-Wright and
Varity, the Supreme Court acknowledged, either expressly or implicitly, that Congress intended ordinary principles of
corporate law, including respondeat superior, to apply to the conduct of corporate employers. n175 Finally, the Supreme
Court's interpretation of similar language in the federal Fair Housing Act in Meyer v. Holley supports the judicial
inference that Congress intended vicarious liability principles to apply under ERISA. n176
Imposing vicarious fiduciary liability directly on the corporate employer under section 404(a) further is supported
by other statutory provisions of ERISA that are designed to provide an important safeguard against employer misuse of
the nonfiduciary settlor power to design the terms of the plan. Under the ordering rule established by section
404(a)(1)(D), the statutory provisions of title I of ERISA supersede any contrary or inconsistent plan terms. In crafting
these statutory provisions, Congress made ERISA's protective policy paramount in creating a federal system for the
regulation of fiduciary conduct. As part of this system, section 410(a) renders void, as a matter of ERISA's paramount
protective policy, any provision in the plan document that would relieve a person from ERISA fiduciary responsibilities.
This prohibition against exculpatory clauses in the plan document supports ERISA's protective policy by reducing the
problem of moral hazard that arises when the risk of fiduciary insolvency due to ERISA personal liability is high.
Permitting employers to use their nonfiduciary settlor powers to design a plan document so as to avoid fiduciary
liability for the conduct of their own internal fiduciary employees would violate the spirit, if not the letter, of section
410(a)'s prohibition on exculpatory clauses. Imposing a federal common law rule of vicarious fiduciary liability
supports ERISA's paramount protective policy and ensures comprehensive enforcement of the responsibilities imposed
on fiduciaries under ERISA.
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Recognizing a federal common law rule of vicarious fiduciary liability under section 404(a) places the risk of loss
on the corporate employer who sponsors the plan by imposing strict liability for the actions of the employer's internal
fiduciary employees. The employer may have acted prudently in its efforts to monitor the fiduciary conduct of its
internal fiduciary employees, and yet these monitoring efforts may have failed to prevent a breach of fiduciary duty by
an employee, acting as a fiduciary within the scope of employment, [*287] that resulted in a loss to the plan. As
between a "prudent" employer and the innocent plan participants whose benefits are secured by the plan's assets,
ERISA's protective policy dictates that the risk of loss should fall on the employer. A federal common law rule of
vicarious fiduciary liability appropriately places the risk of loss on the only party (the employer) who is positioned to
prevent losses to the plan caused by an internal fiduciary employee.
II. The Role of Vicarious Fiduciary Liability in ERISA Civil Actions
Part I of the Article demonstrated that a federal common law rule of vicarious fiduciary liability can be reconciled with
the provisions of ERISA that regulate fiduciary conduct, and that such a rule would be supportive of ERISA's
paramount protective policy. Part II of the Article examines whether a federal common law rule of vicarious fiduciary
liability can be implemented in a limited way that is consistent with ERISA's secondary cost containment policy and
reconciled with its statutory scheme for civil claims and remedies. Lurking in the background of this discussion is
ERISA's sweeping preemption of state law claims and remedies. But preemption of state law claims and remedies under
section 514(a) does not preclude the federal courts from adopting vicarious fiduciary liability as a federal common law
rule of statutory interpretation under section 404(a) of ERISA. n177 Nor does section 514(a) preclude the federal courts
from recognizing vicarious fiduciary liability claims, based on a breach of a section 404(a) duty by an internal fiduciary
employee, under section 502(a) of ERISA.
Section 502(a) has been the subject of numerous Supreme Court interpretations. As a result of these decisions,
fiduciary and nonfiduciary defendants fare quite differently in ERISA litigation. Defendants who are fiduciaries are
subject to monetary damages; nonfiduciaries are not. It is this absence of monetary damages relief under ERISA against
a nonfiduciary corporate principal that leads plaintiffs to bring vicarious fiduciary liability claims based on the fiduciary
misconduct of the principal's employee or agent.
[*288]
A. Supreme Court Jurisprudence on the Federal Common Law of ERISA Claims and Remedies
The federal courts have voiced different perspectives concerning the development of federal common law under
ERISA. One view is that the federal courts may "regularly" incorporate state law contract and trust law principles as
federal common law to fill gaps in the statutory scheme caused by ERISA's express preemption of state law. n178
Another view is that the federal courts should be reluctant to create federal common law in deference to Congress's
legislative authority because "federal common law ... does not grant federal courts carte blanche authority ... to re-write
a federal statute." n179 A middle ground in the debate is the view that

federal courts do have a certain latitude to create federal common law under ERISA. This authority, however, is limited
to instances in which ERISA is "silent or ambiguous," where there is an "awkward gap in the statutory scheme," or
where it may "be said that federal common law is essential to the promotion of fundamental ERISA policies." n180
Over the years, the Supreme Court has voiced support for each of these perspectives in interpreting the civil actions
authorized by section 502(a) of ERISA. n181 In its first major decision interpreting section 502(a), the Supreme Court in
Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Russell n182 rejected the notion that the federal courts may imply a private
cause of action under ERISA as part of a federal common law of ERISA claims and remedies. The Russell Court
reasoned that
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the ... carefully integrated civil enforcement provisions ... of [section 502(a)] as finally enacted ... provide strong
evidence that Congress did not intend to authorize other remedies that it simply forgot to incorporate expressly. The
assumption of inadvertent omission is rendered especially [*289] suspect upon close consideration of ERISA's
interlocking, interrelated, and interdependent remedial scheme, which is in turn part of a "comprehensive and reticulated
statute." ... We are reluctant to tamper with an enforcement scheme crafted with such evident care as the one in ERISA.
n183

Four years after Russell, the Supreme Court in Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch n184 declared that the "courts are
to develop a "federal common law of rights and obligations under ERISA-regulated plans.'" n185 Four years after
Firestone, the Supreme Court in Mertens v. Hewitt & Associates n186 cabined its earlier statement in Firestone with the
caution that "the authority of courts to develop a "federal common law' ... is not the authority to revise the text of the
statute." n187
Most recently, the Supreme Court in LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & Associates, Inc. n188 used its federal common
law authority to address legal obsolescence n189 in section 502(a). The Russell Court's interpretation of section 502(a)
had been based on the norm of the defined benefit type of pension plan that predominated when Congress enacted
ERISA. n190 In LaRue, the Court revisited its prior interpretation in Russell and altered its interpretation to
accommodate the emergence of the defined contribution plan as the new pension plan norm. n191 As a result of LaRue's
modified interpretation of section 502(a), participants in 401(k) and other types of individual account plans now may
use large class actions to vindicate fiduciary duty violations that result in a loss of plan benefits. n192
[*290] In short, over the years the Supreme Court has demonstrated a flexible and pragmatic approach to the
development of federal common law under section 502(a). Accordingly, the Supreme Court again could employ such an
approach to recognize breach of fiduciary duty claims based on vicarious fiduciary liability under section 404(a) as part
of the federal common law of ERISA civil actions under section 502(a).
B. Fiduciary and Nonfiduciary Claims and Remedies: Russell, Mertens and Harris Trust
Section 502(a) of ERISA describes the civil claims permitted under the statute and the specific remedies available for
each particular type of claim. n193 Two types of statutory claims - section 502(a)(2) claims and section 502(a)(3) claims
- are relevant when considering the implications of a federal common law rule of vicarious fiduciary liability.
Section 502(a)(2) authorizes a damages claim against a fiduciary who breaches "the responsibilities, obligations, or
duties imposed upon fiduciaries" by providing "for appropriate relief under [section 409(a) of ERISA]." n194 In Russell,
the Supreme Court held that a damages award under Subsection 502(a)(2) may only be awarded to the plan itself. n195
According to Russell, an individual cannot obtain a damages remedy by bringing a claim for breach of fiduciary duty
under section 502(a)(2). n196 An individual who has been personally injured by a fiduciary's breach of duty may bring a
claim under section 502(a)(3), which serves as ERISA's "catchall" claims [*291] provision. n197 Section 502(a)(3)
provides that a civil action may be brought

by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary (A) to enjoin any act or practice which violates any provision of this
subchapter or the terms of the plan, or (B) to obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress such violations or (ii)
to enforce any provisions of this subchapter or the terms of the plan. n198
The nature of "appropriate equitable relief" available under section 502(a)(3) is limited to "categories of relief that were
typically available in equity (such as injunction, mandamus, and restitution, but not compensatory damages)." n199
Relief under section 502(a)(3) thus excludes a monetary damages award, and further excludes subterfuges that would
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accomplish the same result as a monetary damages award through the creative use of an injunction or an order of
mandamus. n200
Given that section 502(a)(2) damages claims expressly are limited to fiduciary defendants, any claim brought
against a nonfiduciary defendant must be brought under the catch-all section 502(a)(3), which provides for more limited
relief. In Mertens v. Hewitt Associates, n201 the Supreme Court explained why Congress intentionally eliminated
damages awards for claims against nonfiduciary defendants under section 502(a)(3):

The text [of section 502(a)(3)] ... is certainly not nonsensical; it allocates liability for plan-related misdeeds in
reasonable proportion to respective actors' power to control and prevent the misdeeds. Under traditional trust law,
although a beneficiary could obtain damages from third persons for knowing participation in a trustee's breach of
fiduciary duties, only the trustee had fiduciary duties. ERISA, however, defines "fiduciary" not in terms of formal
trusteeship, but in functional terms of control and authority over the plan, thus expanding the universe of persons
subject to fiduciary duties - and to damages - under § 409(a). Professional service providers such as actuaries become
liable for damages when they cross the line from adviser to fiduciary ... . All that ERISA has eliminated ... is the
common law's joint and [*292] several liability, for all direct and consequential damages suffered by the plan, on the
part of persons who had no real power to control what the plan did. n202
Mertens suggests that Congress's purposeful elimination of damages awards against nonfiduciary defendants is a point
for careful consideration when considering a federal common law rule of vicarious fiduciary liability under ERISA. But
the above statement is curiously lacking in guidance. How far does this principle of lesser monetary liability exposure
for nonfiduciary defendants extend?
Dicta in the Mertens opinion initially suggested that a claim against a nonfiduciary could not be brought under any
circumstances under section 502(a)(3). n203 In Harris Trust & Savings Bank v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc., n204 the
Supreme Court held that a claim against a nonfiduciary corporate defendant could be brought under section 502(a)(3) if
the nonfiduciary "knowingly participated" in a fiduciary's violation of the fiduciary responsibility provision of ERISA,
and the relief sought against the nonfiduciary corporate defendant was equitable in nature. n205 The centerpiece of the
Court's reasoning in Harris Trust was the language of yet another statutory provision, section 502(l)(1). n206 Section
502(l)(1), which Congress added to ERISA in 1989, n207 states:

In the case of -

(A) any breach of fiduciary responsibility under (or other violation of) part 4 ... by a fiduciary, or

(B) any knowing participation in such a breach or violation by any other person,
[*293]
the Secretary [of Labor] shall assess a civil penalty against such fiduciary or other person in an amount equal to 20
percent of the applicable recovery amount. n208
Section 502(l)(2) defines the "applicable recovery amount" in relevant part as "any amount which is recovered from a
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fiduciary or other person with respect to a breach or violation described in paragraph (1) ... ordered by a court ... under
subsection [502](a)(2) or [502](a)(5)." n209 The statutory language of section 502(a)(5) permits the Secretary of Labor
to seek virtually the same relief that a private plaintiff may seek in a civil action under section 502(a)(3). n210 It was this
parallel statutory language that led the Harris Trust Court to conclude that "if the Secretary [of Labor] may bring suit
against an "other person' under subsection [502](a)(5), it follows that a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary may bring
suit against an "other person' under the similarly worded subsection [502](a)(3)." n211
Harris Trust involved a claim brought under section 502(a)(3) against a corporate nonfiduciary ("Salomon") who
was the purchaser of assets from an ERISA plan in a sale that was barred per se by ERISA's prohibited transaction rules.
n212 Both the prohibited transaction rules of section 406 and the duties of fiduciaries and co-fiduciaries under sections
404 and 405 are included in part 4 of title I of ERISA. n213 Given the Harris Trust Court's emphasis on the language of
section 502(l)(1), legal scholars read Harris Trust as authorizing a claim under section 502(a)(3) against a nonfiduciary
who knowingly participates in a fiduciary's breach of fiduciary duty. n214
In reading Harris Trust as authorizing claims against nonfiduciary defendants, it is significant that the Supreme
Court maintained a bright line between the plan's fiduciary investment manager, who directed that the plan buy the
motel properties, and the corporate nonfiduciary Salomon, who sold the motel properties to the plan. Even though the
Supreme Court assumed that the corporate nonfiduciary defendant Salomon "knowingly participated" in the investment
manager's breach of fiduciary duty in directing the [*294] plan to engage in a prohibited transaction, this knowledge
did not transform the corporate entity Salomon into a fiduciary. Rather, Salomon remained a nonfiduciary, and therefore
remained subject only to the limited forms of "appropriate equitable relief" available against a nonfiduciary under
section 502(a)(3).
This point is crucial in fashioning limitations on a federal common law rule of vicarious fiduciary liability in light
of ERISA's secondary cost containment policy. The Supreme Court's reasoning in Mertens and Harris Trust indicates
that vicarious fiduciary liability should not be applied to subject an external nonfiduciary corporate principal to damages
claims under section 502(a)(2). If the nonfiduciary corporate principal knowingly participates in the fiduciary's breach
of duty, a claim for "appropriate equitable relief" under section 502(a)(3) may be brought against the nonfiduciary
corporate principal based on section 502(l). Such equitable relief may include monetary restitution, but only to the
extent necessary to prevent the unjust enrichment of the nonfiduciary corporate principal. n215
Consequently, Harris Trust indicates that the common law rule of respondeat superior liability must be modified to
accommodate ERISA's cost containment policy concerning corporate nonfiduciaries. Under the common law, strict
liability attached to the corporate employer who approved or ratified conduct by an employee that was outside of the
scope of employment. If a nonfiduciary corporate principal "knowingly participated" in the unauthorized fiduciary
conduct of an employee or agent, then under this ratification exception the nonfiduciary corporate principal could
become strictly liable for any breach of fiduciary duty by the rogue employee or agent. Harris Trust suggests that a
nonfiduciary corporate principal who "knowingly participates" in a breach of fiduciary duty by a rogue employee or
agent is not transformed into a fiduciary and made subject to a damages claim under section 502(a)(2). Rather, the
nonfiduciary corporate principal remains a nonfiduciary, with potential monetary liability limited to restitution [*295]
as necessary to prevent the unjust enrichment of the nonfiduciary corporate principal under section 502(a)(3).
These prior Supreme Court decisions establish key fundamental principles of statutory interpretation for ERISA
claims and remedies under section 502(a). Fiduciary and nonfiduciary defendants fare quite differently in ERISA
fiduciary litigation. Fiduciary defendants are subject to monetary damages under section 502(a)(2) for losses to the plan
caused by a breach of fiduciary duty. Nonfiduciary defendants are not subject to damages awards, but may be subject to
equitable restitution as necessary to prevent unjust enrichment under section 502(a)(3). This lack of availability of
monetary damages likely motivates plaintiffs to assert theories of vicarious fiduciary liability, thereby making a
damages remedy possible under section 502(a)(2).
To date, the Supreme Court has not addressed the viability of a civil action against a corporate defendant that rests
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on vicarious fiduciary liability under section 404(a) as the basis for a plaintiff's damages claim under section 502(a)(2).
Part III of the Article presents an analytical model for resolving such a claim.
III. The Federal Common Law of Vicarious Fiduciary Liability Under ERISA
A. Distinguishing Between External Corporate Principals and the Internal Fiduciary Employees of Corporate Plan
Sponsors
A review of lower court cases indicates that vicarious fiduciary liability claims arise in two distinct situations. One
situation involves corporate employers who sponsor ERISA plans as defendants. n216 In this group of cases, the
corporate [*296] employer claims that it is not liable as a fiduciary for the actions of its own internal fiduciary
employees. The other situation involves external corporate principals as defendants. n217 In this group of cases, the
external corporate principal may be a fiduciary with respect to an employer's ERISA plan. Or, the external corporate
principal may be engaged to provide nonfiduciary services or financial products to an ERISA plan, but a rogue
employee or agent of the principal performs fiduciary functions with respect to the plan that are outside the scope of the
employment or agency relationship with the nonfiduciary principal.
When analyzing damages claims against a corporate principal based on vicarious fiduciary liability, the federal
courts should distinguish between corporate defendants who sponsor ERISA plans and external corporate defendants
who are engaged as fiduciaries or nonfiduciary service providers to an ERISA plan. There are strong policy reasons for
drawing this distinction. Under ERISA's primary policy objective of protecting the benefits promised to plan
participants, a corporate employer who sponsors an ERISA plan should bear responsibility for the conduct of an internal
fiduciary employee who acts as a fiduciary within the course and scope of employment. Under ERISA's secondary cost
containment policy, external corporate principals who have been engaged to perform nonfiduciary plan services should
not be transformed into fiduciaries and subjected to damages claims under ERISA. Distinguishing between the two
types of corporate defendants based on ERISA's policy objectives is the first step toward bringing logical consistency to
what is currently a disorderly area of ERISA fiduciary law.
To leap directly, however, from ERISA's primary and secondary policy objectives into the labyrinth of the statute's
technical provision is perilous. To bring coherence to this important area of federal law, there must be judicial
consensus on how principles of ERISA fiduciary law apply in the context of vicarious fiduciary liability claims.
[*297]
B. Two General Principles to Guide Vicarious Fiduciary Liability Under ERISA
The federal courts should embrace two general principles in developing a federal common law of vicarious fiduciary
liability under ERISA. The first general principle is that, under section 404(a), vicarious fiduciary liability applies to a
corporate principal whose own employees or agents perform fiduciary functions during the course and scope of their
employment or agency relationship. This first general principle applies to both external corporate fiduciaries and to
employers who designate their own internal officers or employees to serve as fiduciaries for the employer's plan.
The first general principle is supported by the pre-ERISA history of the common law of trusts and trustees, which
imposed respondeat superior liability on a corporate trustee for the acts of its own employees. The first general principle
further is consistent with ERISA's definition of "personal" liability under section 409(a), and supported by the Meyer v.
Holley inference that federal statutes generally incorporate principles of vicarious liability. n218 Finally, the Supreme
Court's reasoning in Curtiss-Wright and Varity supports incorporating vicarious fiduciary liability principles under
section 404(a). n219
In recognizing vicarious fiduciary liability as federal common law under ERISA, the federal courts should be
cautious not to misuse the concept and impose vicarious fiduciary liability in such a way that it contravenes ERISA's
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system for claims and remedies under section 502(a). Specifically, the federal courts should limit vicarious fiduciary
liability so that an external nonfiduciary corporate principal is not transformed into an ERISA fiduciary simply because
an employee or an agent of the principal acts in a rogue manner as a fiduciary outside the course and scope of
employment or the agency relationship with the principal. If the fiduciary conduct of the employee or agent is outside
the scope of employment or the agency relationship, then the corporate employer should not be subject to damages
under section 502(a)(2) for the fiduciary's misconduct. ERISA's secondary cost containment policy requires this
limitation. An unlimited rule of vicarious fiduciary liability would impose prohibitive monitoring costs on [*298]
nonfiduciary plan service providers. Without such a limitation, nonfiduciary plan service providers are likely to pass
these monitoring costs on to employers in the form of higher fees for their services, and thereby deter employers from
voluntarily sponsoring ERISA plans.
The more difficult case is the situation where a nonfiduciary corporate principal may have acquired knowledge of
rogue fiduciary activities by an employee or agent. Under the traditional common law rule of respondeat superior
liability, strict liability attached to the corporate employer who approved or ratified conduct by an employee that was
outside of the scope of employment. Here, ERISA modifies the traditional common law rule of respondeat superior
liability. Under the reasoning of Harris Trust, a claim may be brought against the external principal as a nonfiduciary
under section 502(a)(3) if the principal "knowingly participated" in the fiduciary breach by the unauthorized employee
or agent. n220 Under Mertens, however, the nonfiduciary principal who "knowingly participates" in a fiduciary's breach
of duty is liable only for equitable relief, not money damages, for the actions of its rogue employee or agent. In terms of
a monetary award, equitable relief under section 502(a)(3) includes restitution, but only to the extent necessary to
prevent the unjust enrichment of the nonfiduciary principal. This modification to the traditional common law rule of
respondeat superior liability is necessary to appropriately balance ERISA's primary and secondary policy objectives.
Rather than making the external nonfiduciary principal the plan's guarantor, monetary liability rests on the named
fiduciary of the plan, who ultimately is responsible for the overall operation and management of the plan.
The second general principle concerns how the federal courts should interpret sections 404 and 405 of ERISA in
light of a federal common law rule of vicarious fiduciary liability. In defining a fiduciary much more broadly than a
common law trustee, ERISA recognized that the modern administration of employee benefit plans often required the
corporate employer who sponsored the plan to engage outside fiduciary expertise to administer the plan. Section 405(c)
provides a formal mechanism for a named fiduciary to designate external fiduciaries to assist the named fiduciary in the
management and administration of the plan.
The language of section 405 does not, however, distinguish between external fiduciaries and internal fiduciary
employees of the corporate employer who perform fiduciary functions with respect to the employer's plan within the
course and scope of their employment. Read literally, section 405 could be interpreted by the federal courts as
permitting corporate employers to design their [*299] plan documents as a shield to avoid liability for the actions of
their own internal fiduciary employees.
The second general principle is that section 405 should not be read in a literal manner when applied to internal
fiduciary employees of the employer who sponsors the plan. Rather, section 405 should be interpreted in light of the
overall context of ERISA's system for the regulation of fiduciary conduct and the paramount protective policy that this
system promotes. Specifically, the federal courts should not read section 405 so that the plan document may be used to
shield employers from fiduciary liability for the actions of their own employees who perform fiduciary functions with
respect to the employer's own plan within the scope of their employment. Just as the doctrine of respondeat superior
applied to a corporate trustee, the federal courts should infer that ERISA incorporates the doctrine of respondeat
superior and creates a federal common law rule of vicarious fiduciary liability. Under the second principle, the corporate
employer is not characterized as a co-fiduciary of its own internal fiduciary employee under section 405. When an
internal fiduciary employee engages in fiduciary conduct within the scope of employment, such conduct is performed
on behalf of the corporate employer, and the corporate employer is strictly liable for any breach of fiduciary duty under
section 404(a).
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Grounding a federal common law rule of vicarious fiduciary liability in section 404(a) and not in section 405 is
essential to maintaining ERISA's system for the regulation of fiduciary conduct and the protective policy that this
system is designed to promote. Section 404(a)(1)(D) requires a fiduciary to disregard provisions in a plan document that
are inconsistent with ERISA's statutory scheme for the regulation of fiduciary conduct. Moreover, section 410(a)
renders void as a matter of public policy any exculpatory clause in a plan document that purports to relieve a fiduciary
of its statutory fiduciary duties, including the fiduciary duty to disregard plan document terms that violate the statute. In
light of these statutory provisions, the federal courts should not read section 405 literally so that the plan document may
be used to shield employers from fiduciary liability for the actions of their own internal employees who perform
fiduciary functions with respect to the employer's plan within the scope of their employment. Rather, the federal courts
should read the primary fiduciary duties of section 404(a) as incorporating the concept of vicarious fiduciary liability as
part of the federal common law of ERISA.
By applying these two general principles, the federal courts can resolve multiple scenarios involving damages
claims based on [*300] vicarious fiduciary liability in a consistent and predictable manner. Various scenarios are
modeled in the two diagrams below and explained in the remainder of Part III of the Article. The first diagram involves
a defendant who is an external corporate principal. The second diagram involves a defendant who is a corporate
employer that sponsors an ERISA plan.
Chart 1
Analytical Model of Vicarious Fiduciary Liability for External Corporate Principals
[SEE CHART 1 IN ORIGINAL]
Chart 2
Analytical Model of Vicarious Fiduciary Liability for Employers Who Sponsor Plans
[SEE CHART 2 IN ORIGINAL]
[*301] From a policy perspective, the two general principles appropriately balance ERISA's primary protective policy
and the secondary cost containment policy. External fiduciary principals should be expected to supervise and control the
fiduciary activities of their own employees or agents that are within the scope of employment or an agency relationship
with the principal. If the activities of an employee or an agent are fiduciary in nature and are within the course and
scope of employment, then imposing strict liability in the form of vicarious fiduciary liability upon the corporate
principal is both appropriate and necessary to support ERISA's protective policy. Conversely, external nonfiduciary
principals should not be expected to monitor against the rogue fiduciary activities of their employees or agents. Even if
a nonfiduciary external principal knowingly participates in the rogue fiduciary conduct of its employee or agent,
Mertens and Harris Trust dictate that only limited equitable relief as necessary to prevent the unjust enrichment of the
nonfiduciary external principal is available under section 502(a)(3). To use vicarious fiduciary liability to transform an
external nonfiduciary principal into a fiduciary subject to damages under ERISA for losses to a plan would violate the
policy balance that Congress struck in designing the claims and remedies system of section 502(a).
With regard to corporate employers who sponsor ERISA plans for their own employees, the two general principles
reflect a tilting toward ERISA's primary policy objective of protecting the benefits promised to plan participants and
beneficiaries. A federal common law rule of vicarious fiduciary liability under section 404(a) is necessary to protect
plan participants and their benefits. Such a rule is supported by ERISA's trust law background and by the inference that
vicarious liability generally applies under federal statutes. The alternative - to sanction the settlor function defense and
permit corporate employers to evade responsibility for the conduct of their internal fiduciary employees - would expand
the judicially-created settlor function doctrine in a way that is contrary to both the letter and the spirit of ERISA's
comprehensive system for fiduciary regulation.
[*302]
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C. Illustrations of the Two General Principles

The real problem in vicarious liability, in fact, is not so much the rectitude of its basal principles, as the degree in which
they are to be applied. n221
Part III.C of the Article provides illustrations and explanations of how the federal courts should apply the two general
principles to analyze and resolve different types of cases involving assertions of vicarious fiduciary liability. Consistent
with the two diagrams presented above, the illustrations are organized by two main categories of defendants: (1) claims
against external corporate principals; and (2) claims against a corporate employer who sponsors an ERISA plan for its
own employees.
1. Claims Involving External Corporate Principals
The named fiduciary for an ERISA plan may hire external corporate fiduciaries to assist in the named fiduciary's
administration and management of the plan. A named fiduciary also may hire external corporate principals to provide
services for the plan that are not fiduciary in nature. Four scenarios illustrating possible cases involving both fiduciary
and nonfiduciary external corporate principals are discussed below. For each case, the federal courts must determine
whether a claim based on vicarious fiduciary liability may be brought under ERISA against the external corporate
principal.
a. Named Fiduciary Has Informal Arrangement with an External Fiduciary (Case #1)
A named fiduciary may hire an external corporate fiduciary to assist in the administration and management of the plan.
In Case #1, the named fiduciary's delegation of its fiduciary responsibilities to an external corporate fiduciary is
established through an informal arrangement and not pursuant to a formal 405(c) arrangement specified in the plan
document.
In Case #1, the external corporate fiduciary is subject to vicarious fiduciary liability under ERISA for the fiduciary
actions of its own employees. The external corporate fiduciary may be sued under [*303] section 502(a)(2) for
damages recoverable by the plan resulting from a breach of fiduciary duty under section 404(a) by one of its employees.
Or, the external corporate fiduciary may be sued under section 502(a)(3) for equitable relief if individual relief is sought
by the plaintiff.
The named fiduciary in Case #1 is strictly liable for any breach of fiduciary duty by the external corporate fiduciary
due to the named fiduciary's utilization of an informal arrangement in structuring the relationship with the external
corporate fiduciary. n222 This strict liability eliminates the need for the federal court to engage in an analysis of the
named fiduciary's co-fiduciary duties under section 405(a) or the named fiduciary's duty to monitor the external
corporate fiduciary under section 405(c). The named fiduciary may be sued for damages payable to the plan under
section 502(a)(2) for any breach of fiduciary duty by the external corporate fiduciary, or for equitable relief under
section 502(a)(3) if individual relief is sought by the plaintiff.
b. Named Fiduciary Has Formal Section 405(c) Arrangement with an External Fiduciary (Case #2)
In Case #2, the named fiduciary designates an external corporate fiduciary to perform all or part of its fiduciary
responsibilities pursuant to a formal 405(c) arrangement. For example, if the plan is an insured health care or disability
plan, the named fiduciary may formally designate the insurance company that provides the group insurance policy for
the plan to administer claims under the plan. Or, if the plan is a self-insured health care plan, the named fiduciary may
formally delegate claims administration to an external corporate fiduciary with expertise in processing health care
claims.
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In Case #2, the same general principle of vicarious fiduciary liability applies to the external corporate principal as
in Case #1. The external corporate principal is subject to vicarious fiduciary liability under ERISA for the fiduciary
actions of its own employees. The external corporate principal may be sued for damages recoverable by the plan
resulting from the breach of fiduciary duty under [*304] section 502(a)(2), or for equitable relief under section
502(a)(3) if individual relief is sought by the plaintiff.
Case #1 differs from Case #2 with respect to the potential fiduciary liability of the named fiduciary for the actions
of the external fiduciary. By utilizing a formal 405(c) arrangement to designate the external corporate fiduciary to
perform part of the named fiduciary's responsibilities (e.g., clams administration), the named fiduciary is no longer
strictly liable for the fiduciary conduct of the external corporate fiduciary. n223 The named fiduciary's liability is
reduced to co-fiduciary liability under the factual circumstances described in section 405(a), or based on a failure to
monitor under section 405(c)(2). The details of the analysis of the named fiduciary's co-fiduciary liability under section
405 are discussed in Case #7.
c. Ignorant External Nonfiduciary Principal with a Rogue Fiduciary Employee or Agent (Case #3)
Case #3 arises when the named fiduciary hires an external corporate principal to perform services related to the plan
that are not fiduciary in nature. For example, the named fiduciary may hire a law firm, accounting firm, or actuarial firm
to provide professional services to the plan. Or, an insurance company or a broker-dealer may sell its insurance or
investment products to the plan. In Case #3, a "rogue" employee or agent of the nonfiduciary principal acts in an
unauthorized manner outside of the scope of employment or the agency relationship with the nonfiduciary principal
and, unknown to the nonfiduciary principal, serves as a fiduciary with respect to an ERISA plan.
The rogue employee or agent is, of course, always personally liable under section 409(a) for the individual's own
misconduct as a fiduciary with respect to the plan. n224 As a functional fiduciary, the rogue employee or agent may be
sued for damages recoverable by the plan resulting from a breach of fiduciary duty under section 502(a)(2), or for
equitable relief under section 502(a)(3) if individual relief is sought by the plaintiff. But if the rogue employee or agent
is insolvent, then the plaintiff may attempt to look to the external nonfiduciary principal to satisfy the liability.
In Case #3, Mertens and Harris Trust dictate that no claim may be brought under ERISA against the ignorant
nonfiduciary principal. [*305] Assuming that original relationship between the plan and the external principal was
nonfiduciary in nature, then the federal courts should not impose vicarious fiduciary liability upon the external principal
for fiduciary conduct by a rogue employee or agent that is outside of the scope of employment or the agency
relationship with the principal.
d. External Nonfiduciary Principal Who "Knows" of the Rogue Fiduciary Activities of an Employee or Agent
(Case #4)
Case #4 presents the situation where an external principal originally is hired as a nonfiduciary to provide professional
services or products to a plan. The plaintiff alleges that the external nonfiduciary principal had "knowledge" of the
fiduciary conduct of a rogue employee or agent that was outside of the authorized scope of employment, or even that the
principal "participated" in the rogue fiduciary conduct.
To resolve Case #4, the federal courts must extend the reasoning of the Supreme Court's precedents in Mertens and
Harris Trust to a new factual situation. In both Mertens and Harris Trust, the Supreme Court assumed that the
employees of the external nonfiduciary principal acted within the scope of employment. Case #4 is distinctly different.
In Case #4 the fiduciary conduct of the employee or agent is outside the scope of employment or the agency relationship
with the nonfiduciary principal, but the principal allegedly had "knowledge" of or even "participated" in the rogue
fiduciary conduct.
In Case #4, section 502(l) modifies the traditional common law rule of respondeat superior that an employer may
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ratify, and thereby become strictly liable for, the unauthorized activities of an employee or agent. Even if the
nonfiduciary principal "knowingly participates" in the rogue fiduciary's conduct (within the meaning of section 502(l)),
the nonfiduciary principal is not transformed into a fiduciary. Case #4 requires the federal courts to indulge in a
case-by-case, facts and circumstances determination of "knowing participation" within the meaning of section 502(l).
Under the reasoning of Harris Trust, "knowing participation" in the fiduciary breach of duty by the rogue employee or
agent under section 502(l) is a prerequisite to bringing a claim against the nonfiduciary corporate principal under
section 502(a)(3). If the nonfiduciary principal has "knowingly participated" in the breach of fiduciary duty by of its
employee or agent, and has accepted a monetary benefit, then the federal courts may award restitution [*306] under
section 502(a)(3) as necessary to prevent the unjust enrichment of the nonfiduciary principal. In no instance, however,
should the federal court make "knowing participation" by the nonfiduciary principal the basis for a section 502(a)(2)
claim for damages, which is the remedy available against a breaching fiduciary. To do so would substantially
undermine ERISA's cost containment policy and upset the balance that Congress struck in carefully crafting the claims
and remedies provisions of section 502(a).
2. Claims Involving Corporate Employers Who Sponsor ERISA Plans and Their Internal Fiduciary Employees
Claims against corporate employers who sponsor ERISA plans for their own employees are the most challenging for
the federal courts to analyze because of the multiple roles the employer may play in relation to the company's plan.
Under the judicially-created settlor function doctrine, the employer acts in its settlor capacity and not as a fiduciary
when designing the terms of the plan document. When designing the plan document, the corporate employer may
decide to make the company the plan's named fiduciary. Alternatively, the employer may identify an individual officer
or employee, or a committee composed of officers and employees, as the named fiduciary for the plan. The corporate
employer also may include in the plan document a formal 405(c) arrangement by which the named fiduciary may
designate other persons to perform the named fiduciary's responsibilities in operating and managing the plan. Six
scenarios illustrating possible variations on these themes are presented and analyzed below.
a. Employer as Named Fiduciary: Informal Arrangement with an Internal Fiduciary Employee (Case #5)
In Case #5, the plan document identifies the corporate employer as the named fiduciary for the plan. The employer's
fiduciary duty to manage and administer the plan as the named fiduciary is delegated to one or more of the employer's
own internal employees under an informal arrangement.
The corporate employer in Case #5 is responsible as the named fiduciary for the plan for the entire management
and operation of the plan by its fiduciary internal employees, whether or not those employees act as fiduciaries with
respect to the plan within the [*307] scope of their employment. This result occurs because, absent use of a formal
405(c) arrangement to delegate its fiduciary responsibilities, as the named fiduciary for the plan the corporate employer
is liable for the entire operation, management, and administration of the plan. Thus, in Case #5 the federal courts should
not apply a federal common law rule of vicarious fiduciary liability to the corporate employer and entertain arguments
concerning whether an internal employee acted within the scope of employment in committing a breach of fiduciary
duty with respect to the plan. Section 402 and implementing Department of Labor regulations specify that, as the named
fiduciary for the plan who did not use a formal 405(c) arrangement to delegate its fiduciary responsibilities, the
corporate employer is strictly liable for the entire management and operation of the plan. n225
b. Employer as Named Fiduciary: Formal Section 405(c) Arrangement with an Internal Fiduciary Employee (Case
#6)
Case #6 is similar to Case #5 in that the plan document identifies the corporate employer as the named fiduciary. Case
#6 differs from Case #5 in that the corporate employer utilizes a formal 405(c) arrangement to allocate or delegate all or
part of the employer's fiduciary responsibility to manage and administer the plan to an internal fiduciary employee (or,
to a committee of employees).
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In Case #6, unlike Case #5, at the outset of the analysis the federal court should determine if the internal fiduciary
employee's breach of fiduciary duty under section 404(a) occurred while acting within the scope of employment. If so,
vicarious fiduciary liability should apply, and the breaching fiduciary employee should be characterized as acting on
behalf of the corporate employer under section 404(a), not as a separate co-fiduciary with respect to the corporate
employer under section 405. The conduct of the employee that resulted in a breach of a fiduciary duty under section
404(a) is imputed to the corporate employer under a rule of vicarious fiduciary liability, thereby making the employer
strictly liable under section 409(a) for the employee's fiduciary misconduct. In Case #6, the federal courts should not
entertain a claim against the corporate employer for a breach of a co-fiduciary duty under section 405(a).
[*308] For Case #6, the extent of the corporate employer's vicarious fiduciary liability turns on the scope of
employment of the breaching fiduciary employee. The entire scope of employment for the employee may consist of
fiduciary functions. For example, the delegated employee may have been hired solely to serve as the internal
administrator for the employer's plan. Alternatively, the employee's scope of employment may include both fiduciary
and nonfiduciary tasks. To illustrate, assume that pursuant to a formal 405(c) procedure the corporate employer has
designated an administrative committee composed of officers and employees to administer the employer's plan. One of
the members of the administrative committee also may be the chief financial officer of the company, who is responsible
for the nonfiduciary task of preparing and signing the company's financial statements. In situations where the scope of
employment includes both fiduciary and nonfiduciary tasks, the federal court must engage in a case-by-case, facts and
circumstances analysis of fiduciary tasks performed by the officer or employee, which are subject to the fiduciary duties
of section 404(a), and nonfiduciary tasks performed by the employee, to which ERISA fiduciary duties (and vicarious
fiduciary liability) do not apply.
c. Employer as Named Fiduciary: Formal Section 405(c) Arrangement with an External Fiduciary (Case #7)
Case #7 is factually the same as Case #2, but analyzed from the perspective of the corporate employer's potential
co-fiduciary liability. In Case #7, the plan document identifies the corporate employer as the named fiduciary for the
plan. As the named fiduciary, the corporate employer utilizes a formal 405(c) arrangement to designate an external
fiduciary to perform all or part of the fiduciary tasks associated with operating and managing the plan. For example, the
fiduciary responsibility for claims administration for the employer's plan may be delegated to an external fiduciary who
has the power to approve or deny claims for benefits under the plan. Or, the employer's fiduciary duty to communicate
with participants and beneficiaries concerning their benefits under the plan may be delegated to an external fiduciary.
In Case #7, the corporate [*309] employer as the named fiduciary for the plan and the external fiduciary are
co-fiduciaries with respect to each other and the employer's plan. Because the corporate employer as the plan's named
fiduciary used a formal 405(c) arrangement to designate the external fiduciary, the corporate employer potentially is
liable for a fiduciary breach by the external fiduciary as a co-fiduciary under section 405. Vicarious fiduciary liability
does not apply under Case #7. Rather, the corporate employer is jointly and severally liable for any breach of fiduciary
duty by the external fiduciary only if the corporate employer had actual or constructive knowledge of a breach by the
external fiduciary under section 405(a)(1) or section 405(a)(3), if the corporate employer failed to monitor the external
fiduciary under section 405(c)(2), or if the corporate employer's own fiduciary breach enabled the external fiduciary's
breach under section 405(a)(2).
d. Committee as Named Fiduciary: Informal Arrangement with an Internal Fiduciary Employee (Case #8)
Case #8 is different from Cases #5 through #7 in that the corporate employer, in its settlor capacity, has designed the
plan document to designate a committee composed of internal officers and employees as the named fiduciary for the
plan. n226 The committee informally designates other internal fiduciary employees to perform the committee's fiduciary
responsibilities with respect to the plan.
Case #8 presents the settlor function defense, where the corporate employer has attempted to avoid fiduciary
liability altogether by designing the plan so that a committee composed of internal officers or employees is the named
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fiduciary for the plan. Under a federal common law rule of vicarious liability, the corporate employer cannot use the
plan document as a shield in Case #8 to achieve a different result than in Case #5. In Case #8, the fiduciary actions of
the members of the committee are within the scope of their employment. Therefore, the corporate employer is
vicariously liable for the fiduciary actions of the committee members under section 404(a).
e. Committee as Named Fiduciary: Formal Section 405(c) Arrangement with an Internal Fiduciary Employee (Case
#9)
In Case #9, as in Case #8, the corporate employer in its settlor capacity has designed the plan document so that a
committee composed of internal officers and employees is the named fiduciary for [*310] the plan. Unlike Case #8, in
Case #9 the committee in turn has used a formal 405(c) arrangement to designate other internal employees of the
corporate employer to perform the committee's fiduciary responsibilities with respect to the plan. Under this
double-layered plan fiduciary structure, the corporate employer potentially is two steps removed from the internal
fiduciary employee who breaches a primary fiduciary duty under section 404(a).
Case #9 again presents the settlor function defense, where the corporate employer has attempted to avoid fiduciary
liability altogether by designing the plan as a shield against potential liability for the conduct of its own internal
fiduciary employees. Under a federal common law rule of vicarious fiduciary liability, the corporate employer cannot
use the plan document as a shield in Case #9 to achieve a different result than in Case #6. In Case #9, the fiduciary
actions of the members of the committee and other internal employees are within the scope of their employment.
Therefore, the corporate employer is vicariously liable under section 404(a) for the fiduciary actions of the committee
members or other internal fiduciary employees that occur during the course and within the scope of their employment.
f. Committee as Named Fiduciary: Formal Section 405(c) Arrangement with an External Fiduciary (Case #10)
Case #10 is similar to Cases #8 and #9 in that the corporate employer has designed the plan document so that a
committee composed of internal officers and employees is the named fiduciary for the plan. Case #10 is different in that
instead of using a formal 405(c) arrangement to designate other internal employees to perform the committee's fiduciary
responsibilities, the committee uses a formal 405(c) arrangement to designate external fiduciaries to perform all or part
of the committee's fiduciary responsibilities as the named fiduciary for the plan. n227
Vis-a-vis the relationship between the corporate employer and the committee members, Case #10 presents the
settlor function defense. The corporate employer has attempted to avoid fiduciary liability by designing the plan so that
a committee composed of internal officers and employees is the named fiduciary for the plan. [*311] Under a federal
common law rule of vicarious liability, the corporate employer cannot use the plan document as a shield against the
fiduciary actions of the committee members. In Case #10, the actions of the members of the committee are within the
scope of their employment. Therefore, the corporate employer is vicariously liable for the fiduciary actions of the
committee members under section 404(a).
Vis-a-vis the relationship between the committee and the external fiduciary, the committee as the named fiduciary
and the external fiduciary are co-fiduciaries with respect to each other and the employer's plan. Because the committee
used a formal section 405(a) procedure to designate the external fiduciary, the corporate employer (based on vicarious
liability) and committee members are potentially liable for a fiduciary breach by the external fiduciary as a co-fiduciary
under section 405. The corporate employer (based on vicarious liability) and the committee members are jointly and
severally liable for any breach of fiduciary duty by the external fiduciary under section 405(a)(1) or section 405(a)(3), a
failure to monitor the external fiduciary under section 405(c)(2), or a breach by the committee members of a primary
duty under section 404(a) that enables the external fiduciary's breach under section 405(a)(2).
Conclusion
In enacting ERISA, Congress gave to the federal courts the authority to develop federal common law as needed to
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buttress the rights and remedies created by the statute. This Article claims that the federal courts should develop a
federal common law rule of vicarious fiduciary liability under ERISA based on the traditional scope of employment
approach. In applying such a rule, the federal courts should be guided by two general principles. The first principle is
that vicarious fiduciary liability should apply to a corporate principal whose own employees or agents perform fiduciary
functions during the course and within the scope of their employment or agency relationship. This first principle is
supported by a number of factors. First, the theoretical justifications for respondeat superior liability are consistent with
the policy objectives of ERISA. Second, the common law of trusts, which formed the template for ERISA's fiduciary
responsibility provisions, imposed respondeat superior liability upon a corporate trustee for the actions of its own
internal employees. Third, ERISA's statutory language regulating fiduciary conduct, particularly the definition of a
"person" and [*312] "personal" liability under section 409(a), are consistent with a federal common law rule of
vicarious fiduciary liability. Fourth, prior Supreme Court decisions support the development of a federal common law
rule of vicarious fiduciary liability. In Curtiss-Wright, the Supreme Court expressly acknowledged that ERISA
incorporates general principles of corporate law. In Varity, the Supreme Court implicitly acknowledged that ERISA
incorporates vicarious fiduciary liability. Finally, under the precedent established in Meyer v. Holley, the federal courts
may infer that ERISA incorporates vicarious liability principles.
To be consistent with ERISA's statutory scheme for claims and remedies under section 502(a), a federal common
law rule of vicarious liability must be limited by modifying the common law rule that imposed respondeat superior
liability upon a principal who approved or ratified an agent's injurious conduct that occurred outside the scope of
employment. This limitation applies in the context of external nonfiduciary corporate principals. The Supreme Court's
reasoning in Mertens and Harris Trust indicates that the federal courts should not use vicarious fiduciary liability to
subject a nonfiduciary corporate principal to damages claims as a fiduciary under section 502(a)(2). Even if the
nonfiduciary corporate principal knowingly participated in the rogue fiduciary activities of its employee or agent,
monetary relief against the nonfiduciary corporate principal should be limited under section 502(a)(3) to restitution as
necessary to prevent unjust enrichment of the nonfiduciary corporate principal. This limitation is based upon the
statutory language of section 502(l), which as interpreted by Harris Trust forms the basis for bringing a claim against a
nonfiduciary defendant under section 502(a)(3). According to Mertens, such a limitation on the monetary liability of a
nonfiduciary is necessary to preserve the balance crafted by Congress between ERISA's primary protective policy and
its secondary cost containment policy.
Doctrinally, the federal courts should ground a federal common law rule of vicarious fiduciary liability in the
primary fiduciary duties of section 404(a) and not the co-fiduciary duties of section 405. When an internal employee of
a corporate principal acts during the course and within the scope of employment as a fiduciary, the federal courts should
characterize the employee as acting on behalf of the corporate principal. Under a rule of vicarious fiduciary liability, the
corporate principal would be strictly liable for any breach by the internal fiduciary employee of the primary fiduciary
duties contained in section 404(a).
[*313] Finally, a federal common law rule of vicarious fiduciary liability is necessary to prevent employer
overreaching under the settlor function defense. Absent a federal common law rule of vicarious fiduciary liability, an
employer who sponsors an ERISA plan may abuse its settlor function powers and design the plan document as a shield
against fiduciary responsibility for the actions of the employer's own internal fiduciary employees. This misuse of the
nonfiduciary settlor power, which is contrary to both the letter and the spirit of ERISA's statutory provisions that
regulate fiduciary conduct, would be prevented by a federal common law rule of vicarious fiduciary liability.
Legal Topics:
For related research and practice materials, see the following legal topics:
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liable for the acts of its employee/agents, even if one department has no knowledge of what has happened in another department because the
corporation cannot divide itself into parts).
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n71. 341 U.S. 267 (1951).

n72. Id. at 272.

n73. Compare Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 225(2) (1959), with 29 U.S.C. § 1105(c)(2) (2006).

n74. See 29 U.S.C. § 1104.

n75. See id. § 1109(a).

n76. See Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 496-97 (1996); Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 110-11 (1989).

n77. See Daniel Fischel & John H. Langbein, ERISA's Fundamental Contradiction: The Exclusive Benefit Rule, 55 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1105,
1107-08 (1988).

n78. 29 U.S.C. § 1103(a); see Fischel & Langbein, supra note 77, at 1107 (describing section 403 as a rule of mandatory trusteeship).
ERISA section 403(b), codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1103(b) (2006), lists various limited exceptions to the norm that plan assets must
be held in a trust.

n79. 508 U.S. 248 (1993).
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n80. Id. at 262 (citations omitted).

n81. See Fischel & Langbein, supra note 77, at 1126-27 (criticizing ERISA's trust-law based exclusive benefit/duty of loyalty rule as
inconsistent with the use of internal officers and employers in modern plan administration).

n82. Mertens, 508 U.S. at 263.

n83. Id. at 262-63 (quoting Alessi v. Raybestos - Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 515 (1981)); Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S.
134, 148 n.17 (1985).

n84. See H.R. Rep. No. 93-533, at 1-2 (1973) ("The primary purpose of the bill is the protection of individual pension rights, but the
committee has been constrained to recognize the voluntary nature of private retirement plans. The relative improvements required by this
Act have been weighed against the additional burdens to be placed on the system. While modest cost increases are to be anticipated when the
Act becomes effective, the adverse impact of these increases have been minimized.").

n85. See 29 U.S.C. §§1104-1105 (2006).

n86. 29 U.S.C. § 1105 (providing that a fiduciary may be liable for a breach of fiduciary duty by a co-fiduciary). Courts have found
co-fiduciaries to be jointly and severally liable for each other's breaches. See, e.g., Lowen v. Tower Asset Mgmt., 829 F.2d 1209, 1221 (2d
Cir. 1987); Donovan v. Mazzola, 716 F.2d 1226, 1235 (9th Cir. 1982); Freund v. Marshall & Ilsley Bank, 485 F. Supp. 629, 644 (W.D. Wis.
1979).

n87. See 29 U.S.C. § 1106.

n88. See id. § 1112.
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n89. See id. § 1110(a).

n90. Compare id. § 1110(a), with Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 222(1) (1959). Under the common law of trusts, an exculpatory clause
was effective to relieve the trustee for liability for breach of trust so long as the trustee did not act in bad faith, intentionally, or with reckless
indifference. See Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 222(2).

n91. 29 U.S.C. § 1110(a).

n92. 29 C.F.R. § 2509.75-4 (2005); see also Johnson v. Couturier, 572 F.3d 1067, 1086 (9th Cir. 2009) (prohibiting company that was 100%
owned by an ESOP from indemnifying officers against ERISA fiduciary liability or paying defense costs).

n93. Y. Kotowitz, Moral Hazard, in Allocation, Information, and Markets: The New Palgrave 207, 207 (John Eatwell et al. eds., 1989)
("Moral hazard may be defined as actions of economic agents in maximizing their own utility to the detriment of others, in situations where
they do not bear the full consequences or, equivalently, do not enjoy the full benefits of their actions due to uncertainty and incomplete or
restricted contracts which prevent the assignment of full damages (benefits) to the agent responsible.").

n94. See supra note 50.

n95. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a).

n96. See S. Rep. No. 93-127, at 35 (1973), reprinted in 1 Legis. Hist. at 621 ("State law is preempted. Because of the interstate character of
employee benefit plans, the Committee believes it essential to provide for a uniform source of law in the areas of vesting, funding, insurance
and portability standards, for evaluating fiduciary conduct, and for creating a single reporting and disclosure system in lieu of burdensome
multiple reports.").

n97. See Kennedy v. DuPont Sav. & Inv. Plan, 129 S. Ct. 865, 874-77 (2009) (stating that a valid disclaimer under state law of plan benefits
is not binding on plan administrator if it conflicts with written terms of the plan); Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141, 147-48 (2001) (finding
state law that interfered with plan provision governing distributions preempted).
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n98. 29 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1).

n99. See Kennedy, 129 S. Ct. at 874-75; Egelhoff, 532 U.S. at 147-48.

n100. 29 U.S.C. § 1102(b)(2), (c)(2), (c)(3).

n101. See id. § 1104(a)(1)(D); Cent. States, Se. & Sw. Areas Pension Fund v. Cent. Transp., Inc., 472 U.S. 559, 568 (1985) ("Trust
documents cannot excuse trustees from their duties under ERISA ... ."); see also Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 227 n.7 (2000) (noting
that although plan design is a nonfiduciary settlor function, it may be difficult for a fiduciary in administering the plan's terms to do so in
compliance with ERISA's fiduciary standards). Section 404(a)(1)(D)'s requirement that the fiduciary's duties of prudence and loyalty take
precedence over plan language has arisen where the plan document requires that plan assets be invested in employer securities. See Laborer's
Nat'l Pension Fund v. N. Trust Quantitative Advisors, Inc., 173 F.3d 313, 322 (5th Cir. 1999) (noting that an investment manager must
disregard plan if investing plan assets as required by plan would violate its duty of prudence); Kuper v. Iovenko, 66 F.3d 1447, 1457 (6th
Cir. 1995); Moench v. Robertson, 62 F.3d 553, 569 (3d Cir. 1995); see also Dep't of Labor Op. Letter No. 90-05A, 1990 WL 172964, at 3
(Mar. 29, 1990) (stating that despite plan provisions to the contrary, it is responsibility of fiduciaries to determine, based on all the relevant
facts and circumstances, the prudence of investing large percentage of plan assets in qualifying employer securities); Dep't of Labor Op.
Letter No. 83-6A, 1983 WL 22495, at 1-2 (Jan. 24, 1983) (same). The Department of Labor has long taken the position that fiduciaries must
act prudently and solely in the interest of participants and beneficiaries in deciding whether to purchase or retain employer securities despite
plan language requiring the plan to purchase employer securities. See Brief for Sec'y of Labor as Amicus Curiae Supporting Plaintiffs at
9-10, Agway Inc. Emps.' 401(k) Thrift Inv. Plan v. Magnuson, No. 5:03-CV-1060 (N.D.N.Y. June 18, 2004); Brief for Sec'y of Labor as
Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellant at 13-17, Tatum v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., No. 04-1082 (4th Cir. May 7, 2004); cf. Herman v.
NationsBank Trust Co., 126 F.3d 1354 (11th Cir. 1997) (holding in suit brought by the Department of Labor that an ESOP trustee's decision
not to tender shares of company stock held as plan assets had to be evaluated in light of ERISA's duties of prudence and loyalty; trustee
could not blindly follow the plan's "mirror voting" provision). For additional cases recognizing the general principle that section
404(a)(1)(D) requires fidelity to ERISA's requirements over conflicting plan language, see In re WorldCom, Inc., 263 F. Supp. 2d 745, 764
(S.D.N.Y. 2003); In re Williams Co. ERISA Litig., 271 F. Supp. 2d 1328, 1343 (N.D. Okla. 2003); Rankin v. Rots, 278 F. Supp. 2d 853, 857
(E.D. Mich. 2003); In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 284 F. Supp. 2d 511, 549 n.51, 656 (S.D. Tex. 2003).

n102. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a).

n103. See discussion infra Part II.B.
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n104. Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 262 (1993).

n105. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 1112(a) (bond amounts), with sources cited supra note 50 (damages and settlement awards).

n106. See discussion infra Part I.B.2.d.

n107. 514 U.S. 73, 78 (1995).

n108. 517 U.S. 882, 890 (1996).

n109. 525 U.S. 432, 444-45 (1999).

n110. See infra Part I.B.2.d.

n111. Mertens v. Herwitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 261 (1993).

n112. Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 226 (2000) (emphasis added).

n113. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A) (2006); 29 C.F.R. § 2509.75-8, FR-16 (2005); see Sommers Drug Stores Co. Emp. Profit Sharing Trust v.
Corrigan Enters., Inc. 793 F.2d 1456, 1459-60 (5th Cir. 1986) ("[A] person is a fiduciary only with respect to those aspects of the plan over
which he exercises authority or control.").
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n114. See Beddall v. State St. Bank & Trust Co., 137 F.3d 12, 18 (1st Cir. 1998); Maniace v. Commerce Bank of Kansas City, N.A., 40
F.3d 264, 267 (8th Cir. 1994).

n115. 29 C.F.R. § 2509.75-8, D-3 to D-5; see Donovan v. Mercer, 747 F.2d 304, 308 (5th Cir. 1984).

n116. See Freund v. Marshall & Ilsley Bank, 485 F. Supp. 629, 635 (W.D. Wis. 1979) ("It is apparent from the evidence that many of these
persons were confused about the nature of their fiduciary duties and indeed unsure whether they were fiduciaries with respect to the Plan... .
Their state of mind, however, does not determine their fiduciary status under ERISA.").

n117. Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 504 (1996).

n118. See id.

n119. See 29 C.F.R. § 2509.75-5, D-1.

n120. E.g., Am. Fed. Unions Local 102 Health & Welfare Fund v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 841 F.2d 658, 664 (5th Cir. 1988)
(noting that merely "urging the purchase of its products does not make an insurance company an ERISA fiduciary with respect to those
products"). Plan assets held in an insurance company's general account may, however, render the insurance company a fiduciary by virtue of
control over the management of those assets. See John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Harris Trust & Sav. Bank, 510 U.S. 86 (1993); 29
C.F.R. § 2550.401c-1 (2007).

n121. See 29 C.F.R. § 2509.75-5, D-1.

n122. See, e.g., Coldesina Emp. Profit Sharing Plan & Trust v. Estate of Simper, 407 F.3d 1126 (10th Cir. 2005) (theft of plan assets by
insurance agent); Cont'l Assurance Co. v. Cedar Rapids Pediatric Clinic Emps. Pension Plan & Trust, 957 F.2d 588 (8th Cir. 1992)
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(embezzlement of plan funds by insurance agent); Nat'l Football Scouting, Inc. v. Cont'l Assurance Co., 931 F.2d 646 (10th Cir. 1991)
(embezzlement of plan funds by insurance agent); Meyer v. Berkshire Life Ins. Co., 250 F. Supp. 2d 544 (D. Md. 2003) (mismanagement of
plan investments by insurance agent); Nat'l Mgmt. Assoc. v. Transamerica Fin. Res., Inc., 197 F. Supp. 2d 1016 (S.D. Ohio 2002)
(embezzlement of plan funds by brokerage firm agent); Miller v. Lay Trucking Co., Inc., 606 F. Supp. 1326 (N.D. Ind. 1985)
(misrepresentation of plan benefits by agent, inducing employer and employees to switch insurance plans).

n123. See cases cited supra note 122.

n124. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(9) (2006).

n125. 514 U.S. 73 (1995).

n126. 29 U.S.C. § 1102(b)(3).

n127. Curtiss-Wright, 514 U.S. at 80-81 (citations omitted) (citing 2 W. Fletcher, Cyclopedia of Law of Private Corporations § 466, at 505
(rev. ed. 1990) ("[A] corporation is bound by contracts entered into by its officers and agents acting on behalf of the corporation and for its
benefit, provided they act within the scope of their express or implied powers.")).

n128. 516 U.S. 489 (1996).

n129. Id. at 489, 494.

n130. Id. at 506-07.
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n131. Id. at 503 (emphasis added).

N132. See id. at 498.

n133. See H.R. Rep. No. 93-1280, at 297 (1974) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 3 Legis. Hist. at 4564.

n134. See 29 C.F.R. § 2509.75-8, FR-13 & FR-14 (2005).

n135. See id.

n136. See 29 U.S.C. § 1105 (a)(1)-(3), (c)(2) (2006); 29 C.F.R. § 2509.75-8, FR-13 & FR-14. The fault-based co-fiduciary liability
provisions of Section 405 are discussed infra Part I.B.2.b.

n137. See Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, 525 U.S. 432, 444-45 (1999); Lockheed Corp. v. Spink, 517 U.S. 882, 890 (1996);
Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Schoonejongen, 514 U.S. 73, 78 (1995).

n138. E.g., Harris v. Koenig, 602 F. Supp. 2d 39 (D.D.C. 2009); In re Bausch & Lomb, Inc. ERISA Litig., No. 06-CV-6297, 2008 WL
5234281 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 12, 2008); Cannon v. MBNA Corp., Civ. No. 05-429 GMS, 2007 WL 2009672 (D. Del. July 6, 2007); In re Coca
Cola Enters. Inc. ERISA Litig., No. 1:06-CV-0953 (TWT), 2007 WL 1810211 (N.D. Ga. June 20, 2007); In re Xerox Corp. ERISA Litig.,
483 F. Supp. 2d 206 (D. Conn. 2007); In re Cardinal Health Inc. ERISA Litig., 424 F. Supp. 2d 1002 (S.D. Ohio 2006); In re Westar Energy,
Inc., ERISA Litig., No. 03-4032-JAR, 2005 WL 2403832 (D. Kan. Sept. 29, 2005); Woods v. Southern Co., 396 F. Supp. 2d 1351 (N.D. Ga.
2005); In re AOL Time Warner, Inc. Sec. & ERISA Litig., No. MDL 1500, 02 Civ. 8853(SWK), 2005 WL 563166 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 10,
2005); Kling v. Fid. Mgmt. Trust Co., 323 F. Supp. 2d 132 (D. Mass. 2004); Howell v. Motorolla, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 2d 1079 (N.D. Ill.
2004); In re Tyco Int'l Multidistrict Litig., No. MDL 02-1335-PB, 2004 WL 2903889 (D.N.H. Dec. 2, 2004); In re Reliant Energy ERISA
Litig., 336 F. Supp. 2d 646 (S.D. Tex. 2004); In re Williams Cos. ERISA Litig., 271 F. Supp. 2d 1328 (N.D. Okla. 2003); Crowley ex rel.
Corning, Inc. Inv. Plan v. Corning, Inc., 234 F. Supp. 2d 222 (W.D.N.Y. 2002).

n139. See infra note 146 and accompanying text.
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n140. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A).

n141. Id. § 1104(a)(1)(B).

n142. Id. § 1104(a)(1)(C); see Brock v. Citizens Bank of Clovis, 841 F.2d 344, 346 (10th Cir. 1988); Marshall v. Glass/Metal Ass'n &
Glaziers & Glassworkers Pension Plan, 507 F. Supp. 378, 383 (D. Haw. 1980).

n143. H.R. Rep. No. 93-1280, at 304 (1974) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 3 Legis. Hist. at 4571.

n144. See 29 U.S.C. §§1104(a)(2), 1107(d)(5). Similarly, individual account plans are exempt from ERISA's prohibited transaction rule that
limits an investment in employer securities to no more than ten percent of the plan's assets. See id. § 1107(b)(1).

n145. Id. § 1104(a)(1)(D).

n146. See id. § 1002(21)(A); Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, 525 U.S. 432, 444-45 (1999); Lockheed Corp. v. Spink, 517 U.S. 882, 890
(1996).

n147. See Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 496-97 (1996); Leigh v. Engle, 727 F.2d 113, 122-23 n.19 (7th Cir. 1984); Donovan v.
Cunningham, 716 F.2d 1455, 1464 n.15 (5th Cir. 1983).

n148. See Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 170 (1959).
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n149. See 29 U.S.C. § 1108(c)(3); Chalmers v. Quaker Oats Co., 61 F.3d 1340, 1344 (7th Cir. 1995) ("[Section 408(c)(3)] provides
specifically that employers may appoint their own officers to administer ERISA plans even if the company is a "party in interest.'");
Donovan v. Bierwirth, 538 F. Supp. 463, 468 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), aff'd as modified, 680 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1982) ("Section 408(c)(3) expressly
contemplates fiduciaries with dual loyalties," an arrangement that is "an unorthodox departure from the common law rule against dual
loyalties.").

n150. See Cunnigham, 716 F.2d at 1467.

n151. Bierwirth, 680 F.2d at 271.

n152. See 29 U.S.C. § 1103(a).

n153. See id. § 1102(a).

n154. See id. § 1002(21)(A); id. § 1102(a)(1) (stating that a plan may have more than one named fiduciary); Mertens v. Hewitt & Assocs.,
508 U.S. 248, 262 (1993) ("Under traditional trust law, although a beneficiary could obtain damages from third persons for knowing
participation in a trustee's breach of fiduciary duties, only the trustee had fiduciary duties. ERISA, however, defines "fiduciary' not in terms
of formal trusteeship, but in functional terms of control and authority over the plan, see 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A), thus expanding the
universe of persons subject to fiduciary duties - and to damages - under § 409(a).").

n155. See 29 C.F.R. § 2509.75-8, D-4 (2005); see also, Coyne & Delany Co. v. Selman, 98 F.3d 1457, 1465 (4th Cir. 1996); Kling v. Fid.
Mgmt. Trust, 323 F. Supp. 2d 132, 142 (D. Mass. 2004).

n156. See 29 C.F.R. § 2509.75-8, FR-17; see also, Coyne & Delany Co., 98 F.3d at 1465-66; Martin v. Feilen, 965 F.2d 660, 669-70 (8th
Cir. 1992); Leigh v. Engle, 727 F.2d 113, 134-35 (7th Cir. 1984); Kling, 323 F. Supp. 2d at 142; In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative, and
"ERISA" Litig., 284 F. Supp. 2d 511, 553 n.59 (S.D. Tex. 2003).
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n157. See 29 C.F.R. § 2509.75-8, FR-13.

n158. See id. at FR-14.

n159. 29 U.S.C. § 1102(b)(2).

n160. Id. § 1105(c)(1).

n161. See 29 C.F.R. § 2509.75-8, FR-14 & FR-13.

n162. Id.

n163. 29 U.S.C. § 1105(a).

n164. See Free v. Briody, 732 F.2d 1331, 1335 (7th Cir. 1984); PBGC v. Ross, 781 F. Supp. 415, 419-20 (M.D.N.C. 1991); Freund v.
Marshall & Illsley Bank, 485 F. Supp. 629, 640 (W.D. Wis. 1970). Although the statutory language seems clear that a fiduciary's actual
knowledge of the cofiduciary's breach is not a prerequisite to imposing joint and several liability on the fiduciary under section 405(a)(2),
some federal courts have been reluctant to do so. In Davidson v. Cook, for example, the federal district court rejected the plaintiff's claim of
co-fiduciary liability because

absent ... established knowledge, the defendants cannot be liable. The Court is loath to encourage ignorance, and the Court feels strongly that
in many instances at least some of the fiduciaries should have known of the breaches and taken steps to remedy them. The evidence before
the Court, however, does not adequately establish the required knowledge.
567 F. Supp. 225, 237 (E.D. Va. 1983), aff'd, 734 F.2d 10 (4th Cir. 1984). Compare 29 U.S.C. § 1105(a)(2), with id. § 1105(a)(1), (a)(3).
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n165. 29 U.S.C. § 1105(a)(2); see, e.g., Silverman v. Mut. Benefit Life Ins. Co., 941 F. Supp. 1327, 1336 (E.D.N.Y. 1996); Brandt v.
Grounds, 502 F. Supp. 598, 599 (N.D. Ill. 1980), aff'd, 687 F.2d 895 (7th Cir. 1982).

n166. See Kling v. Fid. Mgmt. Trust Co., 323 F. Supp. 2d 132, 144-45 (D. Mass. 2004); Jackson v. Truck Drivers' Union Local 42 Health &
Welfare Fund, 933 F. Supp. 1124, 1141 (D. Mass. 1996); Mazur v. Gaudet, 826 F. Supp. 188, 189-93 (E.D. La. 1992).

n167. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 1105(c)(2), with Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 225(2) (1959).

n168. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(9).

n169. Id. § 1109(a) ("Any person who is a fiduciary with respect to a plan who breaches any of the responsibilities, obligations, or duties
imposed upon fiduciaries by this subchapter shall be personally liable to make good to such plan any losses to the plan resulting from each
such breach, and to restore to such plan any profits of such fiduciary which have been made through the use of assets of the plan by the
fiduciary ... ." (emphasis added)).

n170. 537 U.S. 280 (2003).

n171. See id. at 285-87. The Supreme Court in Meyer reasoned:

The Fair Housing Act itself focuses on prohibited acts. In relevant part the Act forbids "any person or other entity whose business includes
engaging in residential real estate-related transactions to discriminate," for example, because of "race." It adds that "person includes, for
example, individuals, corporations, partnerships, associations, labor unions, and other organizations." It says nothing about vicarious
liability.

Nonetheless, it is well established that the Act provides for vicarious liability. This Court has noted that an action brought for compensation
by a victim of housing discrimination is, in effect, a tort action. And the Court has assumed that, when Congress creates a rot action, it
legislates against a legal background of ordinary tort-related vicarious liability rules and consequently intends its legislation to incorporate
those rules.

It is well established that traditional vicarious liability rules ordinarily make principals or employers vicariously liable for acts of their agents
or employees in the scope of their authority or employment.
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Id. at 285-86 (internal citations omitted).

n172. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 1002(9) (definition of "person" under ERISA), with 42 U.S.C. § 3602(d) (2006) (definition of "person" under
Fair Housing Act).

n173. Congress enacted the Fair Housing Act in 1968. ERISA was enacted in 1974.

n174. See cases cited supra note 138.

n175. See Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 503 (1996); Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Schoonejongen, 514 U.S. 73, 80-81 (1995).

n176. See Meyer v. Holley, 537 U.S. 280, 285-87 (2003).

n177. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a). Section 514(a) of ERISA broadly preempts "all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any
employee benefit plan." Thus, ERISA preemption under section 514(a) includes preemption of state law respondeat superior liability
principles. Id.

n178. Beach v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 382 F.3d 656, 659 (7th Cir. 2004) (observing that state courts "regularly create federal common
law to fill the gap"). For examples of where federal courts have incorporated state contract law and trust law principles as federal common
law gap-fillers, see cases cited supra notes 2 and 5.

n179. Coleman v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 969 F.2d 54, 58 (4th Cir. 1992) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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n180. Int'l Union of Paper Workers v. Nat'l Indus. Grp. Pension Plan, 342 F.3d 606, 609 (6th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted).

n181. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a).

n182. 473 U.S. 134 (1985).

n183. Id. at 146-47 (quoting Nachman Corp. v. PBGC, 446 U.S. 359, 361 (1980)).

n184. 489 U.S. 101 (1989).

n185. Id. at 110 (quoting Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 56 (1987)). The Firestone Court incorporated common law trust
principles into the standard of judicial review for denial of benefits claims brought under ERISA. See id. at 111-15; see also Franchise Tax
Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 24 n.26 (1983) (""[A] body of Federal substantive law will be developed by the courts to
deal with issues involving rights and obligations under private welfare and pension plans.'" (quoting 120 Cong. Rec. 29942 (1974)
(statement of Sen. Javits))).

n186. 508 U.S. 248 (1993).

n187. Id. at 259 (citing Firestone, 489 U.S. at 110).

n188. 552 U.S. 248 (2008).

n189. In the statutory context, the problem of legal obsolescence arises where a statute no longer fits the current legal landscape or could no
longer be enacted today. See Guido Calabresi, A Common Law for the Age of Statutes 2 (1982). Where a federal statute has become
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obsolete, the federal courts traditionally have addressed the problem through a variety of statutory interpretation approaches and techniques.
See id. at 31-43.

n190. LaRue, 552 U.S. at 253-54.

n191. Id.

n192. The Russell Court previously had determined that subsection 502(a)(2) of ERISA authorized a claim and a damages remedy for
breach of fiduciary duty only if the relief was awarded to the "entire" plan. See Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 142
(1985). The LaRue plaintiff, who was a participant in a 401(k) plan, argued that his damages claim for breach of fiduciary duty could be
brought under subsection 502(a)(2) even though only his personal account under the 401(k) plan, not all participant accounts in the plan,
would receive the damages award. See 552 U.S. at 250-52. The LaRue Court acknowledged that its prior interpretation was based on the
now-outdated norm of the defined benefit pension plan. Id. at 253-56. Recognizing that this norm had since changed to the individual
account plan, the LaRue Court held that subsection 502(a)(2) authorized a claim and relief for a fiduciary breach that impaired the value of a
participant's individual account. Id. at 255-56. In so doing, the LaRue Court made it possible for 401(k) plan participants to assert breach of
fiduciary duty claims under Section 409(a) as class actions under section 502(a)(2) rather than as individual claims under section 502(a)(3).

n193. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (2006).

n194. Id. § 1132(a)(2). Section 409(a) requires the breaching fiduciary to "make good" any "losses" to the plan and to restore to the plan any
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